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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND U. S. AGRICULTURE 
In November 1980, international affairs was self-legitimizing as a topic for 
a seminar on agricultural marketing and policy. Export volume of farm products 
was surging, a trade agreement had just been signed with the Peoples Republic of 
China, and the atmosphere had changed from the surplus of a year before to actual 
or feared shortage. 
By design the seminar, in Dr. Frederick's sum-up words, was "more than an-
other trade conference." As the list of contents below implies, and as the papers 
reveal, the focus was on improving understanding of U. S. agricultural trade in its 
"historical, political, geographic, economic, and social contexts." 
One paper given at the seminar, by Harold F. Breimyer, was devoted to a dif-
ferent subject, the UMC-Perry Foundation seminars as education in public policy. 
This is the eighth in a series of seminars jointly sponsored by the University 
of Missouri-Columbia and the Perry Foundation. Under terms of an agreement the ob-
ject of the seminars is "to promote the development of information relative to the 
socio-economic forces that bear on the welfare of family operated farms and ranches, 
and upon the income to those operators; to disseminate that information widely 
among agricultural leaders of the nation; and to provide a forum . . . for dis-
cussion ..• by leaders of organizations, institutions, and legislators. 1I 
The Perry Foundation was established in Robstown, Texas in 1946 as a memorial 
to members of the Perry family who did much for the agriculture of South Texas. It 
both sponsors and carries on research in agriculture. The Foundation is dedicated 
to working toward a . prosperous agriculture and the welfare of the people on the 
land. 
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GLOBAL FOOD POLITICS 
Richard E. Bell 
Executive Vice President, Riceland Foods 
World carryover stocks of grain in the summer of 1981 will be at pipeline 
levels. Those stocks, wheat, rice, and feed grains combined, will be below six 
weeks' requirements at current rates of consumption. At least six weeks' require-
ments are needed to meet normal pipeline levels. This level will be the lowest 
since the summer of 1975. 
World soybean stocks will be down to eight weeks' requirements. But this pro-
jection is based on harvesting a normal soybean crop in the Southern Hemisphere in 
the spring of the year. Whether this assumption can be realized is only a guess. 
The 1981 soybean crop in the Southern Hemisphere was planted only at the time of 
our Northern Hemisphere 1980 harvest. 
The world's potentially tight supplies of grain and oilseeds in the summer 
of 1981 is the result of a unique circumstance: substantial production shortfalls 
in grain and oilseeds in both the United States and the Soviet Union at the same 
time. It is unusual for the two major countries to have substantial production 
shortfalls during the same year. 
Irrespective of the reasons for the potentially tight supplies next year 
there will likely be a scramble for supplies, and international politics will play 
a major role in determining which countries obtain supplies and at what price levels. 
The world's two super powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- will play 
major roles in the drama about to unfold. 
United States Dominance 
The United States plays a dominant role in the production and international 
trade of basic foodstuffs. The United States produced one out of every five pounds 
of grain consumed in the world last year, and 65 percent of all soybeans. Over 
half of the grain, and two-thirds of the soybeans and soybean products, moving in 
world trade last year were produced in the united States. 
As is well known, the United States suffered major production shortfalls in 
1980 in both grain and soybeans, owing mainly to severe heat and drought in the 
Middle West. Grain production fell to 262 million metric tons compared to the 1979 
record 297 million tons. U. S. corn production was 17 percent below the 1979 record. 
Soybean production suffered a similar fate, dropping especially in the dry 
and hot South. The crop of only 48 million metric tons compared with the 1979 
record 62 million. Nonetheless, the crop was the third or fourth largest op record, 
and will account for 60 percent of the world's expected soybean production in 1980-
81. 
In spite of the production shortfalls, the U. S. will maintain high levels of 
exports of both grain and soybeans in 1980-81 due to the availability of substantial 
reserve stocks from the outputs of earlier years, especially the record harvests of 
1979. Exports of U. S. grain are presently projected at a record 118 million metric 
tons during 1980-81, up from the record of III million tons set in 1979-80. Com-
bined exports of soybeans, oil and meal are expected to be nearly 30 million metric 
tons during 1980-81, not much below the record 32 million tons of the year before. 
As the U. S. will supply huge volumes of grain and soybeans to world markets 
in 1980-81, U. S. reserve stocks of feed grains and soybeans will be exhausted by 
the end of the marketing year. Consequently, the world will be dependent on U. S. 
harvests of grain and soybeans in 1981 to meet world needs during the 1981-82 season. 
Soviet Shortfall 
There is no longer any doubt that 1980 grain production in the Soviet Union was 
well below expectations. Soviet officials apparently believe their 1980 harvest was 
only about 180 million metric tons. This is not much better than the disappointing 
crop of 1979, and 55 million metric tons below the Soviet Government's 1980 goal of 
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235 million metric tons. 
The Soviets will not be able to meet their expected 1980-81 grain require-
ments. They probably will be 25 million tons short of their earlier anticipated 
consumption of 235 million tons. No reserve stocks are left, having been used in 
1979-80. At best, the Soviets probably have the port capacity and internal trans-
portation facilities to import only 35 million tons of grain in 1980-81, or an 
average of 3 million tons per month over the course of the year. 
Unless the embargo is lifted on U. S. agricultural exports to the Soviet 
Union, the Soviets probably will be able to obtain no more than 30 million tons of 
grain for import in 1980-81. In fact, whether they will be able to obtain 30 mil-
lion tons will depend on the grain harvests in the Southern Hemisphere during the 
spring. A more likely import figure is 25 million tons unless the embargo is 
lifted. 
The Soviets will need to stretch their grain supplies as far as possible in 
1980-81. They will do this, in part, by using more soybean meal in order to im-
prove the conversion ratios of the livestock rations being fed. They will buy as 
many soybeans as possible from Brazil and more soybean meal from Western Europe. 
The soybean meal being purchased from Western Europe is produced from U. S. soy-
beans. The Soviets may also buy soybean meal from Brazil, depending on whether 
they can overcome their fears of introducing African Swine Fever into their country 
from Brazil. 
Despite all that can be done to import and stretch available grain supplies, 
the Soviets will need to cut their livestock numbers in 1980-81. They will do this 
primarily by reducing their hog numbers. This will cause a temporary increase in 
Soviet meat production, but will eventually lead to the Soviets' buying large quan-
tities of meat from the world market later in 1981. 
Despite the disappointing Soviet grain harvest in 1980, it is not a disaster 
by earlier Soviet experiences. The Soviets harvested 168 million tons in 1972, and 
only 140 million tons in the disastrous 1975 year. The 1980 Soviet crop was about 
an average crop for the 1971-75 period. The problem, of course, is that Soviet 
grain consumption is much higher than it was in the early 1970s when the Soviet 
Union had just begun its policy of upgrading the diet of the average Soviet citizen. 
The disappointing 1980 crop does point up, however, that the Soviet Union has 
by no means solved the agricultural production problems which have plagued the 
Communist Party since it first came to power more than sixty years ago. Annual 
grain production averaged only 203 million metric tons during the Soviet Union's 
Tenth Five-Year Plan covering the period 1976-80. This was 20 to 25 million tons 
below average annual grain consumption during the five-year period. The Soviets 
have had to make up the shortfall by imports of grain from the United States and 
other countries. 
Soviet grain production was highly erratic during the 1976-80 period. Pro-
duction goals were met in only two of the five years. The average year-to-year 
fluctuation in grain production was more than 30 million metric tons. 
As a result of erratic and disappointing grain production during 1976-80, the 
Soviets were not able to initiate an effective grain reserves policy. In all years 
but one, the Soviets had to depend on imports to fill the deficits in their grain 
production. 
These deficits turned the Soviet Union into the world's second largest im-
porter of grain. Only Japan imported more grain than the Soviet union during the 
last five years of the 1970s. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union's status 
as a major importer of grain will change during the early 1980s. 
Chinese Grain Agreement 
On October 22, 1980 the united States and the People's Republic of China con-
cluded a grain trade agreement covering the four calendar years 1981-84. The agree-
ment commits China to buy, and the U. S. to supply, 6 to 9 million metric tons of 
U. S. wheat and corn during each of the four calendar years. 
For obvious political reasons, the agreement was rushed to a premature conclusion 
before the November 4th general elections. Consequently, the agreement contains some 
serious flaws which may work to the disadvantage of the United States. 
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One of the more obvious flaws in the agreement is that each of the four calen-
dar years of the agreement spans two u. S. crop years. Theoretically, it is possible 
for the Chinese to purchase up to 18 million metric tons of U. S. grain, including 
more than 15 million tons of wheat, from a single U. S. crop without consulting or 
notifying the united States Government. This is because the agreement is on a 
calendar year basis while the U. S. crop marketing year begins in June for wheat 
and in October for corn. 
For example, the Chinese theoretically could purchase for shipment in June-
December 1981, 7.6 million tons of U. S. wheat from the 1981 U. S. wheat crop, and 
later purchase another 7.6 million tons from the 1981 crop for shipment in January-
May 1982. This could all be done within the terms of the agreement and without 
consulting or notifying the united States Government. 
This is different from the 1975 US-USSR Grain Supply Agreement under which 
the Soviets cannot purchase without prior U. S. Government approval more than 8 mil-
lion metric tons of U. S. wheat and corn in any October-September period, and no 
more than 5 million metric tons can be either corn or wheat. The October 22nd 
agreement with China makes an extraordinary supply commitment to China without get-
ting much in return. 
The China agreement also contains an "escape clausell whereby the Chinese need 
not purchase 6 million tons in a given calendar year if there are "unusual circum-
stances." Furthermore, the agreement provides an international sharing arrangement 
if the Chinese do purchase less than 6 million tons of U. S. wheat and corn in any 
given calendar year. 
This has rightly angered the other major grain exporters, especially the 
Canadians and Australians, who see China and the United States making bilateral 
agreements unilaterally affecting their grain exports. It would appear to be the 
type of decision that could be better left to the international marketplace. 
The agreement with China also commits the United States to carry reserve 
stocks of grain for the Chinese. In the Soviet agreement, this responsibility is 
placed on the Soviets. 
Bilateral Commodity Agreements 
It is important that there be no proliferation of U. S. biiateral commodity 
supply agreements beyond those with China and the Soviet union. These agreements 
are designed to meet special circumstances, particularly the one with the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet union and China have the capacity to buy huge quantities of 
grain in a single year. The both have a single government agency that buys all 
their grain for import. 
The purchase systems and policies of China and the Soviet union are not com-
patible with most of our Western-oriented trading systems, especially the market-
oriented system of the United States. Our market-oriented system has served us 
well. We do not want to change it. Therefore, we must build a structure to deal 
with the problem of trading with the two major Communist countries if we want to 
continue to sell grain to them. Bilateral agreements are one way of doing this, 
but we do not want bilateral agreements to become a part of our general trade policy. 
A series of bilateral agreements would, in fact, foster market volatility if too 
much of our trade became tied up in them. 
Western Europe Grain Supplies 
Western Europe may have the trump card in the grain supply situation for 1980-
81. It has just harvested a record grain crop. The European Community has over 
30 million tons of grain available for export in 1980-81, including 15 to 20 million 
tons of wheat. Part of this grain could be sold to the Soviet Union if the Euro-
peans made a decision to do so, for political or other reasons. 
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AMERICA AND THE WORLD, 1980 
Herbert K. Tillema 
Professor of Political Science 
Summary 
The united States has faced disturbing difficulties in the world during the 
last decade; among them Vietnam, the decline of the dollar, the oil embargo and 
oil price increases, new communist or anti-American governments abroad, hostage-
taking in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Many Americans are am-
bivalent about their new-found inability to control events abroad and direct 
America's own future. At one and the same time some persons demand that Washington 
take strong action~ ask for American retrenchment and independence, and express 
fear that the united States is falling irrevocably behind other nations. This am-
bivalence affects domestic politics as well as foreign policy, contributing to the 
uncommonly short careers of recent Presidents, Senators, and Congressmen. 
Much of the variability in recent public attitudes about foreign affairs is 
attributable to unrealistic expectations about America's role in the world. Some 
of these expectations in turn are based upon a misunderstanding of u. S. and world 
history. From time to time in the past the united States has enjoyed an exception-
ally privileged world position, though often a position not entirely of its own 
making. Before World War II major nations allowed the united States to exist out-
side the mainstream of world politics. America's early insignificance, the Euro-
pean balance of power, and geographic isolation all contributed to the granting of 
this license. At the same time the self-contained character of the u. S. economy 
insulated Americans from some unwanted effects of world economics. After World 
War II, largely as a result of damage done to others in the war, the United States 
suddenly found itself not merely a great power but the dominant world power, con-
trolling a majority of the world's political and economic resources. 
American dominance has dissipated since World War II. Among causes are the 
inexorable recovery of other nations from war damage and the diffusion of political 
independence, technology, and wealth. The U. S. economy has also become more inter-
twined with that of other nations. The united States is still the single strongest 
country in the world and it is likely to remain so for some time; but she is no 
longer the equal of the rest of the world put together. The United States alone 
cannot easily direct the destiny of the world nor even assure her own destiny. This 
is an entirely normal situation. Almost all great powers of history have had to 
accept limits and even failure in their efforts to influence others. Our present 
disaffection reveals that our unusual history has failed to prepare us to accept 
this international reality. 
Introduction 
The united States has faced disturbing difficulties in the world during the 
last decade. Protracted war in Vietnam cost lives and dollars. Arab oil exporting 
nations embargoed shipments to America and radically increased the price of oil. 
Unstable exchange rates forced revision of the role of the U. S. dollar in the inter-
national monetary system. communist or other anti-American governments emerged 
among a number of states of the Third World, including Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, 
Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Iran, and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union's military 
capabilities continued to increase. In 1979 Iranian militants, sanctioned by a 
revolutionary government, seized the U. S. Embassy in Tehran and its personnel. 
At almost the same time the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan with military 
force; it has persisted since despite an American-led grain embargo and boycott 
of the summer Olympics. 
The world has become troublesome for America. Moreover, events abroad create 
difficulties at horne. The world fails to respond easily to U. S. efforts to shape 
the course of events, and in doing so presents Americans with problems they do not 
want to face and alternatives they do not want to choose. Many Americans have become 
ambivalent about world politics and the international economy. Many are likewise 
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ambivalent about America's role. To be ambivalent is to hold inconsistent atti-
tudes simultaneously. To be ambivalent is to express unstable preferences. Many 
Americans demonstrate an almost schizophrenic reaction to world events. At one 
moment they bitterly criticize increased oil prices or the seizing of hostages in 
Iran and demand that the u. S. government do something, perhaps including the use 
of military force. At the next moment these same persons ask that America with-
draw from the world, remove troops from foreign soil, suspend foreign aid to other 
countries, and end dependence upon the international economy. At yet another 
moment these same Americans reveal a third and more fearful attitude, speculating 
that the united States may irrevocably fall behind others in the world including 
the Russian military machine and the Japanese or West German economy. They ask 
whether the united States can any longer prosper or be secure, and they fear the 
coming of the 21st century. 
Public ambivalence affects domestic politics. People do not like America's 
alternatives for dealing with the world. None of them will cure anti-Americanism 
abroad, political instability in regions of special U. S. interest, uncertainties 
of energy supply, or foreign-induced inflation. All programs dealing with these 
problems involve both costs and risks. 
In this setting the mood of electoral politics has shifted against incumbents. 
No President since Eisenhower has been elected twice and completed both terms. 
Lyndon Johnson, pressured by opposition to conduct of the Vietnam War did not seek 
a second election. Nixon resigned when he was faced with the prospect of impeach-
ment arising mainly from the Watergate-related scandals but also reflecting in-
creasing disaffection with foreign and domestic economic policy. Ford sought an 
elected term but lost to a candidate inexperienced in national politics who criti-
cized Ford's knowledge and ability to cope with the world. Carter lost his second 
bid for office, amidst charges of incompetence and widespread dissatisfaction. 
Members of Congress, too, have suffered from public disaffection with those who 
hold office. Incumbent Senators and Congressmen, Republican and Democrat, conser-
vative and liberal, have been defeated more regularly in the last decade than 
during any other comparable period in this century. 
Public unease and the volatile character of our recent elections reflect in 
part our inability to cope psychologically with recent changes in the world and 
America's place in it. There is profound conflict between public expectations and 
international reality, and this conflict has disadvantaged every Administration 
since that of Lyndon Johnson. 
The united States has enjoyed an exceptionally privileged history. We tend 
to take those privileges for granted. Many expect the privileges to continue in-
definitely. We sometimes assume that our past insulation from foreign-induced 
problems is a natural condition, or even a natural right. Such expectations are 
doomed to be disappointed. Unusual circumstances in the past have protected us 
from many frustrating experiences normally experienced by nations great and small. 
Lately, we have lost some of those special privileges. Many were acquired by 
historical accident; most have disappeared due to predictable developments outside 
the United States. But we are accustomed to our past special status and our society 
has not yet learned how to face international realities as an ordinary great power. 
A brief look at u. S. history helps to explain our past advantage and present 
problems. America has enjoyed different unearned benefits in succeeding stages of 
her history. Before World War II the united States was protected from many un-
wanted effects of world politics and the international economy by political in-
sularity and economic independence. After World War II and as a direct result of 
it, the United States enjoyed a dominant share of the world's politically-relevant 
and economically-relevant resources. 
The united States Before World War II 
Major world powers permitted the united States to exist outside the mainstream 
of international politics for most of her history. At first this was largely due to 
America's insignificance. In 1800, when size of population was a fair indicator of 
national power, the United States had a mere 5 million people, one-fifth as many as 
Britain, France, or Japan, and far less than Russia's 45 million subjects. America 
was too small then to threaten any major country. Her insignificance also muted 
predatory practices by major nations. To many, she was not worth the trouble Britain, 
for example, never brought the full weight of her military power to bear in efforts 
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to suppress the American rebellion, nor again in the War of 1812. In part this was 
due to the belief held by some Englishmen, including King George III, that America 
was a less valuable colony than others such as India. 
The united States also benefited from the workings of the European balance of 
power. In the nineteenth century the major European powers, including Britain, 
France, Austria, and Russia, possessed roughly comparable capabilities. No one of 
them alone could dominate the rest. Together they created a mutual threat system 
by means of constantly shifting alignments that after 1815 deterred major war for 
a century. At the same time the European balance of power tended to restrain 
foreign adventures by any major power into the Western Hemisphere. Should one 
intervene others would likely counter-intervene so as to avoid permanent shifts in 
the balance among the major nations. This situation, so advantageous to the United 
States, was not created by her own foreign policy. George Washington's proclama-
tion of "no entangling alliances" (meaning no alliances with major European powers) 
and the Monroe Doctrine promising U. S. non-interference in European affairs were 
necessary to assure our country the benefits of Europe's mutual threat system. 
They did not create that system and did not by themselves create America's advan-
tageous isolation. 
Late in the nineteenth century the position in the world changed. Population 
grew. Industrialization dramatically expanded the economy after the Civil War. By 
1900 the United States was herself a world power, albeit a less important one than 
Britain, France, or Germany. Nevertheless, circumstances continued to permit the 
united States to participate selectively in world politics, by her own choice 
rather than under the press of events forced upon her by others. One special cir-
cumstance was geographic distance. Not only was North America far removed from 
Europe given transport of the time, but U. S. foreign interests were geographically 
concentrated. The United States acquired colonies in the Spanish-American War, but 
these imperial holdings were few in number and lay mostly in the Pacific, far from 
Europe. In addition, military technology before World War II gave the United States 
effortless advantage. Even without a meaningful standing defense, and without in-
ternational alliances, the united States was spared international war with another 
major power on American territory. There existed then as now no plausible means 
to conquer the united States by land-based or sea-borne invasion. The technology 
of distant punishment -- long-range bombers and ballistic missiles -- was not in-
vented until World War II. 
From its independence until World War II the united States was uniquely privi-
leged. Unlike most other countries she did not need to play the game of inter-
national politics daily in order to protect her own security. Since she could 
avoid the game when odds were poor, the United States was permitted to retain the 
illusion that international politics is a game which some nations may consistently 
win. At the same time, the U. S. economy was more insulated from foreign-induced 
disturbances than is common among large nations. 
Traditionally, the U. S. economy has not been as dependent upon world markets 
as that of many other countries. Early America was a largely self-sufficient and 
relatively wealthy agrarian society. Unlike many present day less-developed coun-
tries, she was not a major supplier of raw materials to more industrialized nations. 
The united States was heavily involved in only a few world markets, and her exports 
such as tobacco, beaver pelts, and whale oil contributed only a little to the total 
national product. The insular character of the American economy became even more 
evident with industrialization after the civil War. From the beginning, American 
industry has tended to produce primarily for the American mass market. This stands 
in marked contrast to the experience of other industrial countries such as Britain, 
France, Germany, and Japan, who in the 20th century have depended upon world markets 
to consume 15 to 20 percent of annual product. Until recently the United States 
exported less than four percent of what it produced. 
Before World War II the United States was also largely independent of foreign 
suppliers. As late as the turn of this century imports averaged only about $10 per 
person per year, which is not much even in 1900 dollars. Although American firms 
began before World War II the practice of direct foreign investment, which has since 
produced great U. S.-based multinational corporations, the economy has been exposed 
less to the world than that of most significant nations. Only one other major in-
dustrial nation of modern times is so autarkic -- the Soviet Union. 
The self-possessed economy of the united States long imulated her people from 
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events in the world economy. Major changes abroad had only belated, and in most 
cases limited, effects in America. Even more important to American illusions, the 
united States did not often need to play the game of world politics in order to 
protect vital economic interests. Unlike most countries, the United States did not 
have many economic interests that could be endangered by the acts of other nations. 
The few that were exposed were not vital to her economic health. 
The United States After World War II 
World War II changed many things but it did not give Americans a realistic 
picture of what to expect in the world. The war destroyed one set of special 
privileges but substituted another. Just as many Americans are prone to exaggerate 
U. S. importance to the world before World War II, they are also inclined to under-
estimate U. S. control of the globe immediately after the conflict ended. In 1945 
America stood astride the world as few nations have done since the fall of Rome. 
For a time the united States could and did have anything she wanted with little 
effort. 
America's privileged post-war position derived as much from what the war did 
to others as from her own efforts. World War II involved all the major countries of 
the world and all except the United States suffered extensive damage. The war was 
fought in the Atlantic and the Pacific, in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. It 
touched the territories of all major countries except the United States. And al-
though we committed great quantities of money and material to the war, our land, 
industrial plant, and people were little hurt. Fewer than 400,000 U. S. citizens 
died in World War II, less than half the number that perished in the Civil War of 
a century before. No other country was so fortunate. All other major nations lost 
in the war, in one respect or another. Japan and Germany surrendered uncondition-
ally. France technically "won" but part of her territory had been occupied by 
Germany and was freed only at the cost of bloody battle. French agriculture and 
French industry were a shambles at war's end. Moreover, the war forced France to 
withdraw from many of its overseas colonies; she could regain her Empire only at 
great cost. Britain was similarly damaged. Although England escaped invasion, she 
suffered from air attacks. In self-protection she diverted an even larger portion 
of her economy to the war effort than did the United States. Britain, too, lost 
effective control of many economically significant overseas possessions. Even to-
day, her economy has not fully recovered. In one sense, the Soviet Union was the 
greatest loser in the war. Most of the biggest battles took place on the Eastern 
Front, on some of Russia's previously most productive agricultural lands. Important 
portions of her industrial plant were destroyed. Ten million Russian soldiers died 
in World War II, and ten million civilians beside them. This is a greater loss 
than any other nation has sustained in modern history. It amounted to one-sixth of 
the entire population. 
Because of the war's effects elsewhere the United States possessed dominant 
shares of world resources immediately after World War II. At the end of 1945 she 
controlled at least 50 percent of the worldrs gold held for currency purposes. She 
produced 40 percent of all the goods and services in the world with only six per-
cent of the world's people. Fifty percent of the world's effective military man-
power at war1s end wore American uniforms. The United States alone had the technol-
ogy necessary for nuclear weapons, the new horror weapon. The united States 
occupied what amounted to a globe-girdling empire. She ruled unilaterally in Japan, 
the Philippines, South Korea, portions of Southeast Asia and China, and numerous 
islands of the Pacific. Together with war-weakened Britain and inconsequential 
France, the United States occupied Italy, Western Germany, former German-occupied 
France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and part of Austria. The only other 
country that could begin to rival this American empire was Russia, whose rule ex-
tended only to immediately-neighboring territories in Eastern Europe, Manchuria, 
Northern Korea, and the Azerbaijan province of Iran. But Russia's economy in 1945 
was reduced to no more than one-quarter the size of that of the United States. 
International organizations that emerged from World War II were also dominated 
by the United States. The United Nations Security Council identified five permanent 
members with right of veto over substantive resolutions: the United States, Great 
Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union. Immediately after World War II America 
controlled four of these votes because Britain, France, and China were totally de-
pendent upon America. The United Nations General Assembly allowed each member nation 
an equal vote, but nearly half of the original members were Western Hemisphere nations 
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subject to U. S. influence. As late as 1954 an absolute majority of United Nations 
members were military allies of the United states. U. S. dominance was even more 
evident among some new specialized international organizations. The World Bank 
gave voting rights to nations in proportion to financial contributions. The United 
States contributed most of the original funds, garnered the major share of voting 
rights, and established a continuing practice of designating an American as execu-
tive director. The united States acquired similar rights in the new International 
Monetary Fund. 
The united States further enjoyed special advantages in the international 
political economy. Immediately after the war America was disproportionately 
wealthy -- as other previously great economies had sustained heavy damage. The 
international monetary system created at Bretton Woods in 1944 gave the U. S. dollar 
a pivotal role in the national monetary systems of all member nations of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. U. S. monetary practices could, for a time, affect other 
countries' economies in ways that other countries could not affect the United States. 
At the same time the United States remained little exposed in international trade 
markets except through direct foreign investment. The historically low levels of 
U. S. dependence on exports and foreign imports continued until the late 1960s. 
Disruption in international markets, therefore, had muted effect on the U. S. econ-
omY7 and efforts by others to manipulate trade with the united States for political 
purposes generally failed, as in the abortive oil embargoes of 1956 and 1967. 
The United States Today 
The United States enjoyed unparalleled good fortune for most of her history. 
She lived in licensed isolation before World War II. She dominated the world after 
the war. World War II ended isolation. Then predictable developments since 1945 
reduced domination. Massive accumulations of power derived from events such as a 
war tend to be unstable. The vanquished and the damaged recover, the world changes, 
and power tends to disperse. This has happened in recent decades. It should have 
been expected. At most points in history a few major states have dominated inter-
national relations. It is uncommon, however, for one nation to acquire power equal 
to that of the rest of the world combined. When such concentrations do occur they 
rarely last long due to the centrifugal tendencies seemingly ever-present in world 
affairs. 
The world has changed a great deal since the 1940s. For one thing, the world 
is more complicated. There are many more independent nations now. The 51 original 
members of the United Nations have been joined by one hundred others. Many of these 
new nations, mostly former European colonies in Africa and Asia, have socio-economic 
structures that make , them relatively impervious to great power manipulation by 
traditional diplomatic means. International organizations have proliferated. The 
two dozen that existed in 1945 are joined today by 200 more. Many of these, in-
cluding OPEC, are single-issue organizations that attempt to operate in their 
chosen domains with the same authority as nations. Quasi-national assemblages such 
as the Palestine Liberation Organization are increasingly conspicuous. Some persons 
would argue that the largest multinational corporations and financial institutions 
also now wield great independent influence. Security alliances formed in the first 
decade after World War II are disintegrating in both East and West as member nations 
i~reasingly pursue independent foreign policies. Where once only one nation 
possessed nuclear weapons -- the United States -- now there are seven nuclear 
powers: the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, and (we believe) 
Israel. Soon there will be more. Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, South Africa, South 
Korea, and Taiwan are actively developing the bomb as a by-product of civilian 
nuclear power production, and probably will soon have it. By the end of this cen-
tury, as things stand now, nuclear weapons will be routine instruments of foreign 
policy among most sizable nations and some non-national organizations. 
The world economy has also changed in important ways. The quarter century that 
followed World War II was a period of extraordinary economic growth worldwide. The 
world economy expanded in size three to ·four times in real terms. Economic growth 
has slowed since 1970, and not merely in the United States. Some important resources 
that fueled rapid post-war growth have become scarcer and therefore more costly, in-
cluding petroleum and all other forms of energy. In certain ways national economies 
have also become more interdependent, in some cases by design (as among the members 
of the European Community), but in other ,cases as a result of maturing of economies. 
Even the United States today is more dependent upon world trade than before, importing 
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eight percent of what it consumes rather than the traditional three percent. 
These political and economic changes affecting all countries have reduced 
American capacity to shape international events. While the United States is still 
the single strongest country in the world, she is no longer the equal of the rest 
of the world combined. She remains secure within her own borders, but the Soviet 
Union has developed comparable capacity to deter attack upon herself and sufficient 
strength to project military power to regions near her own borders. Other countries, 
while no direct threat to the United States, are now able to resist efforts to co-
erce them by force, as Vietnam so amply demonstrated. The American empire has dis-
solved under the pressure of nationalism as have most of the other empires existing 
at the end of World War II. Only a few Pacific islands remain. Even the Panama 
Canal will revert to Panamanian control at the end of this century. The U. S. 
economy remains the world's largest, but its share of world production has declined 
from 40 to less than 25 percent. Per person, some other nations are as productive 
as the United States, including Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, and West Germany. 
The U. S. no longer exercises unilateral control of international finance, although 
the dollar remains the world's single most important currency for reserve and 
accounting purposes. 
The perspective from which we view these changes makes a great deal of dif-
ference to our ability to cope with international realities. America has encounter-
ed some unsettling limitations in recent years. We can influence other nations but 
that influence generally bears a price that must sometimes be paid in the form of 
real domestic sacrifice. We cannot influence all nations all of the time. Some-
times we fail, as when neither grain embargo nor Olympic boycott induces the Soviet 
Union to behave less blatantly in Afghanistan. Sometimes the price of influence is 
more than we care to pay, as among the nations of Indochina. Sometimes we can find 
no reasonable way to alter others' course, as with the revolutionary government of 
Iran. The intentional acts of other nations and uncontrolled events can hurt us 
at home, economically if not militarily. We ~lone do not control our destiny. We 
do have vital interests abroad that may be threatened and may command reluctant 
response, even when action is risky and without certainty of success. If we think 
that we can transcend these limitations merely by being either more militant or 
more diplomatic we are certain to be disappointed. If we think that we can escape 
these limits by retreating into isolation akin to that of our early history we are 
unrealistic about our interests at a time when the U. S. economy is intertwined 
with that of the rest of the world. If we are unduly fearful we are unfair to our-
selves. 
The limits we face are the realities of international politics. The frus-
trations we experience are normal to life in the anarchic international system. 
Even great powers do not always have their way. Even great powers are affected by 
the world. The united States today is a great power, presently stronger than any 
other single nation and likely to remain so into the 21st century. America has not 
fallen from a normal condition into some special purgatory. Instead the United 
States has moved from positions of special privilege into more normal circumstances. 
In order to protect our interests we must play the game of international politics 
as other nations must play it, with all the risks and costs and failures that are 
part of being a normal member of the community of nations. We are a frustrated 
society just now mostly because our historical experience has failed to prepare us 
for international life as it really is. We are learning. We need to learn more. 
Until we do we shall continue to feel more uncomfortable than situations warrant. 
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A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF A TROUBLE (D) SPOT -- THE MIDDLE EAST 
Christopher Lucas 
Professor of Education 
University of Missouri-Columbia 
I begin with a moral drawn not from national news coming out of the Middle 
East but from confrontations among Middle Eastern factions here on our campus which 
leave most bystanders confused. The moral is that as we fail to communicate we 
fail to comprehend; and as we fail to comprehend we are bound to be left puzzled 
about events in an important part of the world that have a direct and immediate 
bearing on our own lives. 
J. B. Kelly wrote as follows in a recent issue of New Republic magazine: 
We are fated, as the old Chinese saying has it, to live in 
interesting times, and never more so than in the last 18 
months, which have been witness to one of the most resounding 
collapses of foreign policy to have occurred in modern history. 
Almost the whole of the strategy pursued by the Western powers 
in the Middle East since the end of World War II lies about us 
in ruins, leaving our vital economic and policital interests 
in the region virtually defenseless -- and this at a time when 
they are more seriously menaced than ever before. The Iranian-
Iraqi war is only the most recent symptom of this dismal collapse. 
With all respect to Mr. Kelly, who is perhaps the doyen of Middle Eastern ex-
perts, I am not sure whether he is correct in his analysis or whether there is in 
fact a "dismal collapse" and "disastrous failure" of Western policy in the Middle 
East. But I do suggest as a necessary first step in understanding events in this 
troubled and troubling part of the world, that we take a look at five determining 
factors or formative influences on the region. 
Pan-Arab ism: 
The search for Arab Unity, the age-old dream of a single Arab Nation, 
a sense of solidarity that is enjoyed by Arab peoples, in a great arc 
that stretches across the whole of North Africa through the southern 
portion of what is conventionally referred to as the Near East and on 
to the Iranian border. 
Radical Nationalism: 
Islam and the Islamic faith, as a cultural dynamic and its relationship 
to the West. The countervailing tendency toward fragmentation, separation, 
and internal division. 
Islam: 
As a cultural dynamic in relation to the West. 
Oil: 
The volatile catalyst in the explosive mix of events. 
The Palestinian Question: 
A festering sore whose impact on Arab politics is consistently under-
estimated in the West, and goes largely unappreciated. 
Arab politicians like to claim that the "Arab Nation" stretches from the At-
lantic to the gates of Persia, 160 million or 180 million strong, not 22 separate 
and independent countries; and that Arabs everywhere constitute a single cultural 
and spiritual union. Argues Tariq Aziz, foreign minister for Iraq: they are 
"people of a community united by language, religion, legend, history, and past 
achievement ... 
It is clear that unity, political, cultural, and religious, has been the ideal, 
the obsession, and indeed the aching dream of Arabs for generations, stretching back 
in an unbroken chain to the reign of AI-Mutasim in ninth century Baghdad. 
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Says Libyan leader Col. Muammar Khaddafy, "Arab unity is the inevitable 
fate of the Arab Nation, and the solution to all its problems. 1I 
This first fact of a sense of solidarity, however imperfectly realized, is a 
conditioning factor in Arab politics. More to the point, it is a powerful deter-
minant of Arab perceptions of the outside world. It is perhaps responsible for a 
good deal of xenophobia, distrust of the foreigner, and sense of kinship and ident-
ity within Arab culture. It gives rise to an in-group feeling arrayed against what 
are perceived to be implacable, hostile forces occupying the outside world in gen-
eral and the Western world in particular. 
As we are all painfully aware, the Arab record on unity is one of failures 
and not successes. It has been rightly said of the Middle East that what we find 
there is a welter of perishable alliances and far more durable antagonisms. 
Regional conflicts are endemic. Even today sectional rivalries are alive and well. 
Despite the ago-old obsession with unity, Arabs persist in nurturing almost para-
noid fears of one another. Even today, Morocco and Algeria are locked in confron-
tation. Border clashes between Libya and Egypt could resume at any time. North 
and South Yemen remain as divided as ever. In fact, the only tangible past effort 
at political union, which could at best be called a qualified success, was the 
establishment of the united Arab Republic as a union of Egypt and Syria underAbdel 
Nasser. It endured only from 1959 to 1961. Other attempts at union have floundered. 
That between Libya and Algeria proved short lived as did the at'tempt of Libya to 
unite with Tunisia. Syria and Iraq at one point, incredible though it may seem in 
retrospect, forged what was termed at the time "an unbreakable union," a union that 
lasted less than a year. These former allies are now at odds with one another and 
armed conflict could break out at any time. 
The last chapter in this dismal record of failure is the attempt at marriage 
of Libya with Syria. Few outside observers see much chance of success. 
Part of the problem is that practically every major Arab world leader seeks 
to acquire power by which to direct Arab destinies and ultimately to control the 
oil resources of the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. The most notable 
figure in this history of efforts at territorial aggrandizement and political in-
fluence was of course Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Anwar Sadat initially nurtured hopes 
of inheriting the mantle of influence that Nasser and the Nasserites once enjoyed. 
But today there are many other rival contenders on the scene: Libya's Col. Khaddafy, 
Syria's President Assad, in a limited way Jordan's King Hussein and Saudi Arabia's 
King Khalid. 
The web of political and military ties emerging around the Iranian-Iraqi war 
is complex and paradox-ridden even by Middle Eastern standards. The basic line-up 
of Iraq allied with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, with Iran allied with Syria and Libya 
a set of alliances that cuts across virtually every political, ideological, and 
sectarian bond in the region -- once again makes the old slogan of Arab unity ring 
hollow. 
The web of alliances is prompted by a variety of considerations. We cannot 
truly interpret events reported in the news without understanding something of the 
motives and considerations of realpolitik that enter into these alliances. The 
House of Saud in Arabia harbors a profound fear of Ayatollah Khomeini's anti-mon-
archist, Islamic, revolution and thus he sides with Iraqis President Saddam Hussein 
in hopes that Iraq will provide the vital counterforce to whatever territorial and 
political aspirations the Ayatollah may nurture. For his part, President 
Hussein clearly wants to succeed the Shah, now toppled from his Peacock Throne, as 
the principal power in the Gulf. So he seeks to ingratiate himself with the con-
servative gulf states who might then accept Iraqi hegemony in the event of a 
decisive Iraqi victory in the war with Iran. 
More confusing still is the fact that Syria's President Assad, who ironically 
enough heads a government dominated by a faction present in Iraq, allies himself 
with Iraq's enemy Iran. And Assad allies with Libya in order to gain access to 
Soviet arms in case Syria has to fight Iraq. He also believes his dissident ele~ 
ments, notably the Shi'ite minority, to be backed by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. 
Jordan's King Hussein fears Khomeini's revolution in terms of an internal 
threat posed by the Shi'ites but he also wants to gain influence with the Saudis, so 
he aligns himself with their ally Iraq. A related goal of Hussein is to have a 
voice in the establishment of a Palestinian state, when the time comes, without 
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directly challenging Arafat. So we have the additional paradox of a monarchical 
ruler allying himself with Iraq, a government very different in character from his. 
Hussein hopes to build enough influence with small Persian Gulf states to be able 
to have a say in any final agreements that might be reached between the PLO and 
Israel. 
Down in tiny Kuwait the Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheik Saad al Salah 
share the Saudis' concerns over a Shi'ite minority, and hence the country tilts 
toward Iraq. The irony here is that Kuwait has long been involved in a border dis-
pute with Iraq. 
The united Arab Emirates, Dubai in particular, must remain neutral because of 
a large Persian minority -- like a fifth column. Other Persian Gulf states such as 
Qatar back Iraq as a probable winner. 
The ultimate issue in the Iraqi-Iranian war is which regime will emergy with 
military and political preeminence in the Persian Gulf during the 1980s. 
Ironically, neither the Soviet union nor the United States stands to gain 
significantly from the war's outcome. At this time, no major power exercises clear 
control over events in the 'Persian Gulf. From the mid 19th century to about 1971, 
Great Britain guaranteed the security of the autonomous states and dependent 
territories that encircle the Persian Gulf. About 1971 Britain withdrew its forces 
from east of the Suez and refused to be any longer a guarantor of the security of 
that region. At the time the united States was bogged down in vietnam and for var-
ious other reasons was reluctant to pick up the British mantle and elected to 
support the Shah of Iran as a surrogate, a guarantor of Western security and in-
terests including protection of the vital oil transit routes through the Strait of 
Hormuz. 
As is now well known, U. S. policy backfired when the Shah's rapid fire pro-
gram of development alienated the traditionalists and drove a wedge between them 
and a kind of technocratic elite who shared the Shah's ambition for creating in 
Iran a major power, a new West Germany of the Middle East. The U. S. policy back-
fired because dissident revolutionary elements embracing every possible coloration 
from Islamic fundamentalism to Marxism forged links and created a revolutionary 
coalition that succeeded in toppling the Shah from the Peacock Throne. 
Meanwhile, apparently with the covert, implicit encouragement of the Nixon 
administration in general and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in particular, the 
Shah moved to become a kind of OPEC price "hawk." One object was to finance the 
ambitious program of modernization on which he and his nation had embarked. The 
successful revolution against the Shah created a major power vacuum in the Middle 
East, a vacuum that Iraq's President Hussein now seeks to fill by eliminating the 
last vestiges of Iranian military supremacy. His effort began with an attempted 
blitzkrieg against Iran's oil rich Khuzestan province. The Iraqis seized the bor-
der waterway and three islands; but at this moment it appears that Hussein may 
have miscalculated, perhaps fatally. Iraq's oil industry has been damaged severely, 
and the Iraqi threat appears to have been the catalyst to re-unite Iran internally. 
Without the Iraqi war Iran might have disintegrated from within. That is no longer 
likely, at least not soon. 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union would dearly love to gain control over the re-
volution in Iran. It would like to get a foothold in Iran's northern provinces and 
it looks to the future when it will need access to Iranian oil. But the Soviet 
union does not want to antagonize Iraq, with whom it still has a defense treaty. 
Yet if it were to give big logistic aid to Iraq it would compromise its own sym-
pathizers within the Iranian revolution. So in a sense the USSR has to sit on the 
sidelines. What the USSR wants ultimately is an outlet to the Indian Ocean. It 
may be most likely to get it through treaties establishing a military presence in 
Iraq. If it cannot get it there it will seek to get it through Iran. 
The United States likewise professes a policy of neutrality. So we too sit 
on the sidelines for now. Our position is highly disadvantageous. We enjoy few 
links of any kind with Iraq. Of course the U. S. presence in that part of the world 
is opposed vigorously by Islamic militants in Iran. Yet an Iraqi victory could 
threaten Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab states of the Gulf. It is con-
ceivable, in view of the long distance from the united States, that those states in 
the event of an Iraqi victory would be drawn into an alliance with Iraq: and that 
such a confederation would blackmail the West with oil in order to gain support for 
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the Palestinian cause to which Iraq is firmly committed. 
Now Islam as a third major force. Until recently it has been fashionable 
to deride the idea of any deeply rooted animosity against the West on the part of 
Arabs, or Moslems in general. It has not been fashionable to accept the idea that 
actions by Islamic governments were inspired by hostility to Christendom. Yet the 
enmity felt by the Moslem-Arab world for the Judaic-Christian West is real enough. 
If anyone doubts that, he should read the latest fulminations by the various 
Iranian Ayatollahs and take note of the passionate response evoked among the masses 
in Iran and by Shi-ite minorities elsewhere throughout the Arab world. 
The Western presence in the Middle East has been one of long standing. It 
began long before the modern era. The role that the West played more often than 
not was that of an adversary of Islam. The memory of the Crusades dies hard, and 
historical memory is alive and well in the Middle East. And so the West, which is 
usually equated in the Arab mind with Christendom, with imperialism, with capitalism, 
with materialism, with debauchery, with secularism, remains a familiar and tangible 
enemy, a convenient scapegoat, an adversary which has never ceased, at least in 
popular mythology, to oppress and exploit the Arab peoples. The feelings of resent-
ment felt against the West are tangible. 
Conventional wisdom has held that the incompatibility of mosque and Marx, of 
Islam and communism, would serve to insure that the Arab states would never ally 
themselves voluntarily with the Soviets against the Western powers. The record of 
the past few years should by now have put that myth to rest. Algeria, Libya, Syria, 
Iraq, North Yemen, South Yemen, Egypt, Kuwait, and the Sudan -- all at one time or 
another have entered into compacts of one kind or another with the Soviet Union. 
Both Syria and Iraq are now linked to the Soviet Union by defense treaties. 
The operating rule in the Middle Eastern part of the world is, "The enemy of 
my enemy is my friend." This helps account for a lot of the defensive alliances. 
Fourthly, oil. I quote J. B. Kelly once again: 
Arabs see the oil weapon as a gift sent by God to redress the 
balance between Christendom and Islam. It enables them to 
act as though the might and grandeur of the Umayyad and Abbasid 
caliphates had been restored, to lay the Christian West under 
tribute to the Moslem East, and to fulfill the destiny which 
God in his infinite wisdom has ordained for those to whom he 
has chosen to reveal the one true faith. 
This may strike us as extravagant fancy; but fancy or reality, it has a 
real appeal in the Arab world. 
Present oil production in the Middle East, without Iran or Iraq, amounts to 
about 13.6 million barrels per day. This is a shortfall of 3.8 million barrels 
caused by loss of Iranian and Iraqi oil. About 1.S million barrels will be made 
up by increased output from other Gulf states. The new level may be at capacity 
or even above a safe output. The shortfall will still be 2.3 million barrels. The 
United States and the other 19 members of the International Energy Agency hold 
about a ISO-day reserve. That is a slim margin, especially if the 1980-81 winter 
proves to be severe. 
I will not review the history of OPEC; but in terms of the context of the 
Iranian-Ir·aqi war it is worth noting that three major OPEC policies projected to 
be realized by now are in disarray. One was to go off the dollar standard and sub-
stitute a weighted basket of currencies. At the outbreak of the war Arab nations 
were buying heavily into the yen, pound sterling, and other currencies. This shift 
must wait. Also in disarray is the idea of a common supply program -- a production 
target for each OPEC member. And the prospect of a common price policy does not 
seem realizable now. 
The great fear is for bilateralization. That is, when the Iranian-Iraqi war 
ends both countries may feel a need to enter into bilateral deals for financing 
reconstruction -- with France, and with other Western powers. The whole market 
structure for oil would change, accentuating the element of instability in the region. 
In these remarks one element is missing: the Palestinian question. This is 
really the wild card in the deck. Most Gulf states enjoy large "guest worker" popula-
tions -- Palestinians. There are an estimated 400,000 of them. For example, in 
Saudi Arabia 75 percent of the foreign labor force is Palestinian. It is estimated 
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that 80 percent of the population of the united Arab Emirates is foreign, and a 
high percentage of the foreigners is directly allied with the Palestinian cause. 
The meaning to be drawn is that no Arab leader can afford to ignore the Palestinian 
issue. To the extent that the United States or other Western powers tilt to Israel 
or appear to fail to take into account what is regarded as the just needs of the 
Palestinian people and the establishment of a secular Palestinian state -- to that 
extent the Palestinian question serves as a convenient rallying ground -- as a 
focus for some concerted effort. It is a dangerous equation which the Soviet Union 
has been quick to exploit. It has been subsidizing and providing arms to terrorists, 
polarizing East-West relations. And it is a problem that will not admit of any easy 
solution in years to come. 
These remarks, although appearing complex, only skim the surface. The Middle 
East remains fascinating, puzzling, difficult, and in some respects dangerous. 
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THE WORLD DIMENSION TO U. S. AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
Abner w. Womack and Maury Bredahl 
Professors of Agricultural Economics 
The export market for U. S. agricultural commodities can be characterized as 
a growth industry. Fiscal 1980 export volume is estimated by USDA to have been 
about 162 million metric tons valued at $40 billion. This compares with 137 mil-
lion metric tons shipped in 1978-79 valued at $32.2 billion. 
Several factors are associated with the strength in U. S. export demand. 
Schuh concludes that the U. S. dollar devaluation played a major role. Other per-
sons claim a basic change in the livestock production policy of the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe was a major factor. Based on our research at the University of 
Missouri, we concur that these were important factors. However, we also agree with 
Grennes and Johnson that governmental policies in exporting countries also were im-
portant. Apparently the price inSUlation policies of major exporters were a very 
significant factor contributing to an increase in the U. S. share of world trade, 
especially for wheat and coarse grains. 
Combined with these interrelated factors is the apparently strong demand for 
meat products in developed countries, as seen in Western Europe, Japan, and Canada. 
Policies in importing and exporting countries affect U. S. markets. The 
European Economic Community, for example, places relatively high variable levies 
on imported coarse grains and wheat. This is also the case in Japan. Canada con-
trols wheat exports via a wheat marketing board. Farmers are assigned a production 
quota and receive final payment for grain after export sales are concluded. In 
this manner farmers receive price signals that are lagged somewhat longer than in 
the U. S. market. In conjunction with this strategy, Canada has experienced trans-
portation constraints that have reduced export capability. 
Soybeans and their products, on the other hand, are traded in a comparatively 
free market environment. For this reason we agree with Schuh that the international 
monetary market has been a particularly significant factor in determining the level 
of world trade and therefore U. S. exports of beans and bean products. 
We conclude that the following factors have been the most significant in-
ducements for U. S. trade in grains: (1) U. S. policy that encouraged exports to 
centrally planned economies beginning in the early seventies; (2) a shift in 
consumer demand toward meat products in developed countries; (3) decisions in 
centrally planned economies to increase meat supplies to consumers; (4) supply 
limitations by major U. S. competitors via price signals to producers, together 
with transportation contraints; (5) devaluation of the dollar relative to 
currencies in developed countries; (6) the ability to respond to higher prices 
in bringing additional area into production; and (7) the current u. S. farm 
program based on a managed buffer stock policy. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the fundamental economic forces under-
lying this rapid expansion in exports. This will be done by examining, via trend 
analysis, the gaps between consumption and production for major trading regions; 
shifts in world utilization and in levels of supplies from competing countries; 
impacts world economic variables have on the U. S. sector, employing an econometric 
model; and the most likely future directions the U. S. industry will take. 
World Trends in Coarse Grains, Wheat, Soybeans 
As they comprise the major portion of U. S. exports, this section is limited to 
the three major export commodities, corn (and other coarse grains), wheat, and soy-
beans. 
Corn exports, after remaining in the 600-million-bushel range during the late 
1960s, increased dramatically to 1,258 million bushels in 1972. In the past 10 years 
the volume has doubled again to around 2.5 billion bushels. Associated with these 
changes is the amount of U. S. cropland reflected in corn exports. The harvested 
acreages are about 7 million in 1969, 13 mi11ion in 1972, 22 million in 1979. Corn 
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exports now are about 40' percent of U. S. corn production and equivalent to the 
same percent of acreage. 
Exports of wheat and of soybeans and soybean products have increased sub-
stantially during the same period. Wheat exports were 610 million bushels in 1971, 
representing 18 million harvested acres and 55 percent of U. S. production. The 
1979-80 export volume is estimated by the USDA to have been 1,375 million bushels 
representing 40 million harvested acres and 64 percent of U. S. production. 
Soybean exports in 1971 were 416 million bushels, the harvest of 15 million 
acres and 35 percent of production. Exports of beans for the 1979-80 crop year 
are estimated at a record 875 million bushels, from 27 million harvested acres. 
They were 38 percent of U. S. production. Exports of meal and beans combine& in 
1979-80 were 32.5 million metric tons, equal to about 1,200 million bushels of 
beans -- equalling approximately 37 million acres of land and 53 percent of pro-
duction. 
The magnitude of this export market in 1979-80 is reflected in total land 
area attributable to grain and soybean-exports. Of the 260 million acres in those 
crops approximately 40 percent was directly related to the level of exports; that 
is, about 4 acres out of every 10 planted were utilized to support this level of 
exports. 
Figures 1 through 5 give an overview of the world coarse grain industry. 
Production and consumption for each major region are shown plus trend equations 
based on data for the period 1960 through 1978. 
Figure 1 reflects the total world coarse grain complex with total consump-
tion projected at 742 million metric tons in 1980 and corresponding production at 
723 million metric tons. The trend rate of growth in world consumption is 14.8 rnmt. 
or 583 million bushels per year. 
The Soviet Union, figure 2, and Western Europe, figure 3, account for a sig-
nificant portion of world growth in demand. The trend gap, consumption above 
production, for these two regions combined as of 1980 is 36 million metric tons 
(1,418 million bushels). The gap is growing at the rate of 31 million bushels in 
the Soviet Union and 15 million bushels in Western Europe. Figure 4 represents 
the differential in growth for all other regions, which include Japan, Canada, and 
less developed countries. As in the previous case the gap between consumption and 
production is growing, in this case at a rate of 43 million bushels per year with 
a current trend gap of about 790 million bushels. 
Figure 5 represents coarse grain trends as a total for all regions outside 
the united States. It helps to explain the growing depend~nce by foreign markets 
on U. S. coarse grains. The consumption-production gap has widened abDut gO mil-
lion bushels per year. The current trend-level dependence is almost 2.2 billion 
bushels. 
As indicated by figure 6 the United States has been able to sustain a pro-
duction capacity that accommodated these fairly rapid rates of growth in the world 
market. This has primarily been accomplished by utilizing the equivalent of an 
additional 1 million acres of coarse grain area each year. 
Figure 11 indicates that almost 40 percent of U. S. corn production is now 
exported. It also shows the rapid expansion of corn exports since 1970, a growth 
rate of 200 million bushels. The longer trend beginning in 1950 was only 63 million 
bushels increase per year. 
Figures 12 through 17 sketch the world situation for wheat. As indicated by 
figure 12, world consumption of wheat is growing at a rate of 9.52 mmt. per year 
(350 million bushels). The consumption and production levels for the world in 
1980 are estimated by the USDA to be respectively 438 mmt. and 444 mmt. 
The USSR, figure 13, became a net importer in the late 1960s and has continued 
so since. The trend gap between consumption and internal production as of 1980 is 
about 6 mmt. (220 million bushels) and is growing at an annual rate of 23 million 
bushels. 
Western Europe, figure 14, has converted from a net importer of wheat to a net 
exporter, a balance that has prevailed since the early 1970s. Currently these trends 
suggest that Western Europe now produces about 5 mmt. (184 million bushels) in excess 
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of consumption and that the margin is increasing at a rate of 23 million bushels 
per year. This exactly offsets the deficit rate by the Soviets~ however, as of 
1980 the Soviet deficit (trend value) is a little greater than the Western Europe 
surplus. 
Other areas in the world, (less developed countries, Japan and Canada) are 
also net importers of wheat (figure 15). The deficit is growing at a rate of 
35 million bushels per year with a substantial 1980 gap between consumption and 
production of 28 mmt. (1,028 million bushels). 
Figure 16 represents all areas outside the U. S. The trends indicate that 
production in the rest of the world is not keeping pace with consumption. The gap 
of 35 mmt. (1,286 million bushels) as trend value for 1980, signifying dependence 
on U. S. production, widens about 35 million bushels per year. 
Figure 17 reflects the U. S. position. U. S. agriculture has contributed 
slightly in excess of 1 million additional ac~es of wheat each year. 
Figure 22 indicates that U. S. wheat exports have increased 31 million bushels 
per year as a long run trend. However, this rate has almost doubled since 1968, 
moving up to 50 million bushels per year. Using actual yields for the 1979-80 
crop of 32.5 bushels per harvested acre, this growth implies an additional 1.5 
million acres per year to cover the expansion in wheat exports -- a little more 
than the long run trend. 
Figures 23 through 26 reflect the growth in the U. S. soybean export market. 
As indicated in figure 23, the U. S. difference between production and consumption 
has been growing at a rate of 30 million bushels per year. This is roughly equiv-
alent to 1 million additional acres of land each year to meet growing export mar-
ket requirements. The long term trend, however, has accelerated since 1968, grow-
ing recently at a rate of 40 million bushels each year or about l~ million acres 
of soybean land. 
In summary, these rates of growth in exports of the three commodities require 
3 million more acres of cropland each year. If these rates continue U. S. agri-
culture could face land constraints by the mid 1980s. 
World utilization and Competing Supplies, Grains and Soybeans 
For coarse grains and soybeans and soybean products the primary strength in 
export demand has come from developed countries. Figures 7 and 26 illustrate. 
Corn exports to these regions have tripled since 1970, moving from 10 mmt. then to 
29.3 mmt. in 1978. In 1978 developed countries took 54 percent of total corn ex-
ports, a reduction from 80 percent in 1970. Less developed countries increased 
their share from 1.4 mmt. to 9.6 mmt. during the period, a growth rate of 0.9 mmt. 
per year. Developed countries stepped up their takings 2.1 mmt. per year. 
Aditional strength in exports since the early 1970s came from the centrally 
planned economies (figures 7 and 8), principally the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. Those buyers took 0.72 mmt. of U. S. corn in 1970 and 13.5 mmt. in 1978, 
a growth rate of 1.4 mmt. per year. 
In 1975 the U. S. exported 15.1 mmt. of soybeans. Developed countries ac-
counted for 72 percent of these exports. Of the approximately 14 mmt. shipped in 
1978 these countries represented about 66 percent of total exports. 
The mix of destinations of wheat exports has changed dramatically since the 
mid 1960s (figure 18). Of U. S. wheat exports of 725 million bushels in 1964 
approximately 77 percent were PL-480 shipments. Commercial exports comprised 
103 million bushels to developed countries and 60 million to less developed coun-
tries. This pattern continued until 1972 when the U. S. policy shifted towards 
less aid commitments and centrally planned economies were allowed to trade for u. S. 
wheat. 
This latter policy shift is also reflected in figure 19. Centrally planned 
economies have been significant but highly variable traders in the world market. 
In 1963 and 1964 net wheat imports by these regions reached 18 mmt. but these in-
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Value of U.S. Exports of Soybeans 
And Products 
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Fiscal year beginning OClober 1. 
U.S. Exports of Soybeans and Products' 
Total 
Soybeans 
Soybean meal 
Soybean oil 
1975176 1976/77 1977178 1978/79 
Million dallars 
4,052.0 5,637 .6 6,410.9 4,486 .9 
3,038 .3 4,306.6 4,749.0 3,376.5 
806.1 917.9 1,121.1 764.1 
207.6 413.1 540.8 346.3 
I October -September, except 1978179, which is October .March. 
Totals computed from unrounded numbers. 
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eluded very little from the united States. In 1972 these countries had a net im-
port of almost 24 mmt. of which the U. S. supplied approximately 15 mmt., more than 
one-half. 
Wheat buying by centrally planned economies continues upward with China be-
coming more significant recently. U. S. exports to these regions have recently 
fluctuated around 4 mmt. of wheat per year. Minimum trade agreements with the 
Soviet Union and China will likely sustain a sizable share of this market. 
The United States has remained a viable competitor during recent rapid ex-
pansion in world trade for grains and soybeans. The U. S. share of the world wheat 
market increased from 45 percent in the early 1970s toaround 56-59 percent later 
in the decade (figure 20). U. S. production increased during those years. Major 
wheat exporters increased their harvested area from an average of 38.1 million 
hectares in 1970-71 to 1972-73, to 48.8 million in 1973-74 to 1975-76 (figure 21). 
The united States accounted for almost 64 percent of the increase. 
These data imply either that (1) producers in other major exporting countries 
did not perceive a significant increase in prices or (2) unlike the u. S., other 
major countries did not have additional capacity available. 
Adverse weather may occasionally have played a role as the data reflect har-
vested rather than planted area. At the very least, the data indicate a very slow 
and relatively small response in production by major exporters other than the United 
States. Canada, for example, did not reach a level of production equal to that of 
the mid-sixties until 1976-77. 
The United States may have an equal or greater comparative advantage relative 
to the rest of the world in coarse grains than in wheat (figures 9 and 10). The 
three major competing regions, Brazil, Thailand, and Argentina trended upward in 
oor.n exports from around 2.4 mmt. in 1960 to 7 mmt. in 1977. During the same period 
U. S. exports increased from 6.3 to 49 mmt. The current U. S. share of world trade 
is in excess of 60 percent. This share was about 38 percent in 1970 (figure 27). 
As in the case of wheat major competitors have not kept up with the pace of 
world demand in coarse grains. Thus the united States through its ability to bring 
additional land into production plus increasing yield per acre, has captured a 
steadily larger percentage of world trade each year. 
Soybeans are grown primarily in the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and 
China. The U. S. percentage averaged about 60 percent in the later 1970s (figure 
25). Unlike corn and wheat, where the U. S. share has increased over time in soy-
beans our South American competitors have been able to keep pace. Brazil and 
Argentina have held a fairly constant percentage of total world trade. But all 
regions have experienced stronger demand. From year to year, however, the U. S. 
soybean market has felt the impact of production variations in those countries. 
Economic and Other Variables 
Associated with Export Demand for U. S. Grains and Soybeans 
An econometric model of the U. S. grains industry developed by the agricultural 
economics department at the University of Missouri-Columbia has been utilized to ex-
amine impacts of factors affecting world trade. The model is designed to reflect 
the total structure of the grain and soybean industry. Equations reflect the U. S. 
production industry via crop acreage, domestic utilization of feed, food, commercial 
stock, government purchases, farmer-held reserves, policy exports to centrally 
planned economies, and commercial exports. 
The model has been solved for variables that represent these factors. A 
summary of these impacts follows. 
Table 1 reflects the price impact of corn, wheat, and soybeans relative to 
quantities of these grains shipped to centrally planned economies -- the Soviet 
Union, Peoples Republic of China, and Eastern Europe. The decision by the U. S. 
Government to enter these markets resulted in expansion of trade after 1970 as in-
dicated by figures 7 and 18. 
But the level of this expanding trade has been scarcely predictable from year 
to year. In 1974, for example, the U. S. shipped less than 100 million bushels of 
corn to these regions. In 1975 and 1978 more than 500 million bushels of corn flowed 
into these markets. 
30 
According to the impact measures given in Table 1, approximately 17 cents 
of the 1974 season average price of corn could be associated with those exports. 
In 1975 and 1978 approximately 85 cents of the season average price is estimated 
to be related to markets in centrally planned economies. 
Shifts from year to year also have a spillover impact. Since grains and soy-
beans are competitive in the world market,even with each other, shifts in corn 
prices result in changes in wheat and soybean prices. Thus while the expansion in 
trade has contributed to the overall strength in U. S. prices, the underlying fact 
is that additional volatility has been introduced into the U. S. market place. 
Minimum trade agreements in conjunction with a managed stock program in the 
united States are aimed at reducing some of the rather strong shocks. 
Table 1 
Price Impact of U. S. Grain and Soybean Exports 
to Centrally Planned Economies, and of Wheat 
Exports under PL-480 
Increase in U. S. 
price per bushel 
Item Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Exports to centrally planned economies (100 mil. bU.) 
Corn $.17 $.14 
Wheat 
Soybeans 
.22 
PL-480 Exports (100 mil. bU.) 
Wheat 
Table 2 
U. S. Price Impact of Livestock Production and of Grain 
and Soybean Supplies and Export in Foreign Countries; 
and of Selected Monetary Variables 
.81 
$.07 
.40 
.09 
.15 
Increase in U. S. 
price per bushel 
Livestock prod.uction (1,000 mt.) 
Hogs, Ec6 
Hogs, Japan and U. K. 
Poultry, Ec6 
Poultry, Japan and U. K. 
Crops 
Wheat supply, all foreign countries (10 mmt.) 
Corn exports, all foreign countries (1,000 mt.) 
Corn supply, EC9 (1,000 mt.) 
Soybean exports, Brazil (1,000 mt.) 
Soybean meal exports, Brazil (1,000 mt.) 
Monetary variables 
EC threshold price (10 UOA/mt.) 
Dollar devaluation ($/SDR, 10%) 
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Corn 
.30 
.20 
.86 
.55 
-.07 
-.06 
-.08 
-.09 
.03 
.09 
Soybeans Wheat 
.56 .08 
.37 .24 
1.65 .22 
1.01 .45 
-.23 
-.05 -.03 
-.05 -.03 
-.30 -.04 
-.18 -.04 
.17 .01 
.42 .04 
Table 1 also implies that wheat shipped under PL-480 agreement has less 
overall price impact than wheat shipped to centrally planned economies -- approx-
imately 15 cents per 100 million bushels in the former case and 40 cents per 
100 million bushels in the latter. A decision by the U. S. Government to curtail 
PL-480 shipments of wheat in 1971, figure 18, resulted in expansion of commercial 
trade with its higher market price impact. This implies that for each 100 million 
bushels delivered under the PL-480 program, commercial exports would decline such 
that net exports were substantially less than the original 100 million bushels. 
Therefore this change in policy would imply higher domestic price impacts as the 
PL-480 share of exports decline. This has been the case since 1971. 
Table 2 reflects measured price impacts associated with foreign economic 
and policy variables. As implied by these price measures, the growth in the live-
stock industry in key foreign countries has contributed to the strength in the 
U. S. prices of grains and of soybean and soybean products, all of which helped to 
support this expanding industry. 
Hog production has expanded in the European community (EC-~ by about 1.4 mil-
lion metric tons (mmt.) since 1971. Each additional 1.0 mmt. is estimated to in-
crease corn prices by 30 cents per bushel, soybeans by 56 cent~ and wheat by 8 
cents. Poultry production has a stronger price impact relative to volume; it has 
expanded 0.69 mmt. since 1970. 
Foreign countries have increased their production of grains and soybeans, all 
of which are competitive with U. S. supplies. However, as indicated by figure 27, 
the united states has steadily expanded its share of trade in coarse grains and 
has maintained a firm percentage of the wheat and soybean market. 
Devaluation of the dollar relative to trading partners has also helped to 
expand exports and therefore contributed strength in grain and soybean prices. The 
approximate 20 percent dollar devaluation is estimated to have added an additional 
82 cents strength in bean prices, 18 cents in corn, and 8 cents in wheat since 
1971. The relatively higher impact on soybeans is associated with the free market 
nature of world trade for soybeans and soybean products. Wheat and coarse grains 
enter markets that are constrained by levies and grain marketing boards which nor-
mally imply an above-world-market price. 
Implications for the Future 
Although the present atmosphere is optimistic, the overall picture is not 
entirely rosy. Continued strength in export demand will require an additional 
20-24 million acres of land by 1990, barring any breakthrough in crop yields. 
Additional land reserve is estimated to be about 30 million acres; thus this 
scenario implies that the united States may begin to approach land constraints by 
the mid to late eighties. 
This increased pressure on demand will result in higher prices for grains. 
Fertilizer, however, as well as capital equipment and other inputs will continue 
to rise in price and elevate costs of production. Marginal land will be more ex-
pensive to h.ring into production and it will be less productive. Therefore higher 
prices for grain crops will be less yielding of added output in the future. Higher 
prices for crops would of course be necessary to sustain farmers' income, which may 
not improve appreciably. 
Any substantial expansion in acreage would raise problems of soil conserva-
tion. Also, if a new boom in exports were to p~ess on supplies of farm products 
for domestic consumption, policy issues, especially in the area of embargoes, 
would be difficult to resolve. 
A short-term remedy to the Soviet grain embargo was to increase production of 
ethanol for motor fuel that could require an additional 50 million bushels of coarse 
grains (the harvest of about 500 thousand acres) each year. This may prove to be 
the most critical decision made by the administration in handling the embargo. 
Exports and ethanol use could mean higher prices for feed grains, primary 
inputs into the livestock industry. The residual impact will be reflected in a 
slower expansion of livestock supplies with corresponding implications for domestic 
food prices. 
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An alternative scenario is related to the steady increase in energy prices 
and the corresponding strain on economies of the world to keep pace, especially 
underdeveloped countries. Shifts in this direction are unclear and rather difficult 
to predict. However, economic decisions will be concerned with short term versus 
longer term capital and other productive investment. If countries run into enough 
trouble U. S. exports will not continue on the paths implied in the above analysis, 
but will be somewhat smaller. In this event the united States could return to the 
position of carrying the larger proportion of world stocks, and functioning as the 
residual supplier on the world markets; and prices could be at or near U. S. loan 
rates. Some of this lower price impact could be offset by imposing set-asides of 
U. S. acreage so as to bring the total industry into balance. This is a greater 
possibility for wheat than for the coarse grains and soybeans and soybean products, 
as world pressure of demand is likely to be less for wheat than for the other 
products. 
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THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM IN RETROSPECT 
Don Schilling 
Professor of Economics 
The stories economists tell seldom have a moral. I feel it my duty to fill 
that deficiency: I offer a moral first. You may choose to believe it or not as 
you please, but I will build my story around it. 
Moral: "When you get what you think you want, it is seldom good for you. 1I 
Everyone who has taken a course in international economics knows about the 
gold standard and how it works. A nation on that standard declares a price for 
gold in terms of its currency and stands ready to buy or sell "unlimited" quan-
tities of gold at that price. The result is an implied IImint par" exchange rate 
between any two gold standard currencies. Also, there is always a means by which 
to obtain or dispose of a "foreign" currency through gold at a fixed price. The 
mint par is banded above and below by gold arbitrage points at a distance deter-
mined by shipping and insurance costs on gold. The instant an exchange rate 
touches one of these points, gold arbitragers who have been lurking at the edge of 
the market like jackals at the edge of a lion pride's supper leap into action. 
They buy the foreign currency in whichever market (foreign exchange or through 
gold) is cheaper and sell it in the other (dearer) market for a guaranteed profit. 
The movement of gold simultaneously shrinks the (gold backed) currency of the gold 
losing (deficit) country and expands that of the gold gaining (surplus) country, 
causing the former's price level to fall and the latter's to rise. All of this 
was pointed out by David Hume in a truly beautiful essay in 1752. The inter-
national equilibrium once disturbed is thus restored automatically and with 
beautiful simplicity. 
Insofar as this system ever existed, it was snuffed out along with several 
million lives by World War I. Many years later, when W. A. Brown, Bloomfield, 
and Morgenstern systematically sifted the data on the workings of the gold standard, 
they found that in actuality, gold rarely moved. The remarkable exchange rate 
siability of the major currencies for the half century preceding 1914 was largely 
due to two factors: (1) shrewd manipulation of interest rates and credit avail-
ability by the Bank of England, and (2) a constellation of conditions in the de-
veloped and developing countries which now appears to have been a unique moment in 
history, one unlikely to be repeated. 
The 21 years between World Wars I and II saw various attempts, ultimately 
futile, to reconstruct and reestablish the gold standard. After World War II, how-
ever, a fixed rate system was reestablished as a part of the Bretton Woods Treaty 
of 1944 which also birthed the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
The IMF system, as it is often called, was one in which the world's currencies 
were linked only indirectly to gold through the U. S. dollar. 
Twenty years intervened between 1948, when currency reforms in Europe allowed 
exchange markets for current transactions to be restored, and 1968, when estab-
lishment of a "two tier" gold market made the demise of fixed exchange rates in-
evitable. In hindsight, those 20 years were also somewhat of a IIgolden age." 
Exchange rate changes were relatively infrequent and world trade grew more than 
8 percent per year, while the world's poor countries developed much faster than 
they have since 1973. On the other hand, the initial dollar shortage of 1948 turned 
into a dollar glut by the 1960s. Dissatisfaction with the Bretton Woods System be-
came increasingly vocal among professional economists. Some academic economists 
particularly objected to the explicitly manipulative role of national governments 
that was built into the system. 
A small but growing minority of academic economists led by Milton Friedman 
began a campaign to return to a more "automatic" system that would be less manipula-
tive than the Bretton Woods one, both domestically and internationally. Recognizing 
that the necessary conditions for a gold standard no longer existed, Friedman 
plumped for a floating exchange rate system in which exchange rates would be 
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determined by the interplay of market supply and demand free of governmental manip-
ulation. The following Friedman statements in a 1967 pUblication outline the 
effects of floating exchange rates as he and others envisioned them. 
As this example suggests,_a system of floating exchange rates completely 
eliminates the B. of P. Lbalance of payment§! problem -- just as in a 
free market there cannot be a surplus or a shortage in the sense of 
eager sellers unable to find buyers or eager buyers unable to find 
sellers. The price may fluctuate but there cannot be a deficit or a 
surplus threatening an exchange crisis. Floating exchange rates would 
put an end to the grave problems requiring repeated meetings of secre-
taries of the Treasury and governors of central banks to try to draw 
up sweeping reforms (p. 15). 
Under a system of floating exchange rates, the liquidity problem dis-
appears. There is no need for official foreign exchange reserves. 
Private indiviauals will provide the reserves needed -- just as they 
do in commodities that trade in a free market. If a given movement 
in exchange rates seems temporary, it will be in the self-interest 
of private holders of exchange to dampen the move by speculation and 
they can be counted on to do so (p. 16). 
The major objection raised against floating rates is one already 
mentioned -- that it would remove the "discipline" which fixed rates 
are said to impose on domestic economic policy, that it would open 
the door to irresponsible inflationary monetary policy. This ob-
jection ... has negligible merit for the united States (p. 21).1 
The flexible exchange rate world was envisioned as one in which day to day 
stability would be maintained by private speculation, where as a consequence govern-
ments would rarely need large amounts of liquid reserves. There would be few if 
any inflationary consequences for the United States and by implication for the 
rest of the developed world. The revolution began in 1971 as the dollar was cut 
loose from gold. After a brief interregnum, by early 1973 the transition to a 
floating currency world in which we live today was completed. 
I now review a number of the major characteristics of today's floating rates, 
some of which were anticipated more or less correctly and some incorrectly, but 
others of which have come as a surprise. 
The first quotation from Friedman has largely been borne out by experience. 
Private buyers and sellers of foreign exchange have essentially made the market 
and there have been no crises in the sense of surplus or shortage of any currency. 
What was unforeseen, however, was that the short run variation in foreign exchange 
rates · would be so large. The month to month variability in the exchange rate for 
the pound, French franc, and deutschmark against the dollar has lain approximately 
halfway between the lesser variati~n in wholesale price indices and the greater 
variation in stock market indices. 
Thus instead of smooth waves, the interaction of commercial traders, port-
folio adjustments, and speculation seems to have produced a pattern of sudden shifts 
and jumps in exchange rates. 
A Illiquidity problem" arose in the 1960s as the growth of international trade 
as carried out on an essentially constant ultimate base of gold led to increased 
use of the U. S. dollar as a component of international reserves. This in turn 
led to attenuation of the potential convertibility of the dollar into gold. From 
this came the SDR (Special Drawing Rights) and many "plans" for liquidity which 
would not contain the seeds of its own destruction. As Friedman points out, the 
need for liquidity should be greatly reduced in a floating system as it is no 
longer necessary to defend fixed exchange rates. However, the evidence from the 
past for today's (admittedly dirty) floating rates is that reserve usage as 
1 J. A. Frenkel and Michael L. Mussa, liThe Efficiency of Foreign Exchange Markets 
and Measures of Turbulence", A.E.R., Vol. 70, #2 (May 1980) pp. 374-81. 
2 M. Friedman & R. Roosa, The Balance of Payments: Free versus Fixed Exchange Rates, 
American Enterprise Institute, Washington D. C. 1967. 
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distinct f~om reserve holdings 3 has not significantly declined and indeed may have 
increased. Since floating, total reserves have increased greatly, and usage has 
not decreased noticeably -- an unanticipated result. 
The question of whether some valuable IIdiscipline li has disappeared now that 
nations no longer need make their domestic policies conform to a fixed exchange 
rate is not really susceptible to an unarguable answer. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that the rate of inflation both in the united States and elsewhere during the 1970s 
has been greatly in excess of that experienced during the years when exchange rates 
were essentially fixed. Although the oil price rise has contributed, the historical 
record suggests that floating rates have eroded discipline over price levels. It 
would at least be hard to argue otherwise. 
At one time political leaders importuned by ever present lobbyists carrying 
the Oliver Twist message of IIMore" could reply that budgets dare not be unbalanced 
nor was it safe to lose gold via a balance-of-payments shortfall. Then economists 
whispered the Keynesian message that during recession it is wrong to balance the 
budget, denying the first defense; then flexible exchange rates later obviated the 
second. The results in terms of deficits created by unrestrained growth of trans-
fer payments and the concomitant growth of money supply is obvious to anyone who 
has lived through the last nine years. 
continental Europeans welcomed almost with glee the breaking of the link be-
tween gold and the dollar. They believed they would see a quick end to the over-
blown importance of the dollar, a result of the aritificial terms of the Bretton 
Woods Treaty making the dollar the only currency directly convertible to gold and 
hence the reserve currency. To Europeans' discomfiture, the dollar has scarcely 
diminished in importance as its holding in world reserves grew steadily during the 
1970s and the Eurodollar market burgeoned. 
The reason for this outcome is explained in courses in Money and Banking, 
where we learn that the most basic function of money lies in the domestic economy. 
Money is a "medium of exchange" enabling avoida.l.lce of double coincidence of wants. 
Or, as I tell my classes, "Money is a turnpike providing an efficient and well-
developed indirect route between two goods which is less costly than the direct 
route, just as going from Jefferson City to Kansas City via turnpikes 63 and 70 is 
usually preferred to the direct route over the two-lane highway 50. The market 
between any good and money is institutionally rich and well developed, while the 
direct (barter) market between any two goods is thin and seldom used. 
Exactly the same process holds internationally. When Paraguay and Thailand 
wish to make a deal -- the Thais want to purchase Paraguayan beef -- they must 
denominate and finance the transaction in some currency. Neither, however, will 
deal in the other's currency because the Thai Baht is almost useless to Paraguyans. 
A Baht-Guarani foreign exchange market simply does not exist any more than a 
direct exchange market between beer and lipstick exists in the u.S. So what 
happens? The transaction between Thailand and Paraguay would almost surely be 
billed in dollars, financed in dollars and paid in dollars because the Baht-dollar 
market and Guarani-dollar market are well developed and dollar financing is 
available in the United States or in London through the Eurodollar market at highly 
competitive rates and lowest possible transactions cost. The U. S. dollar is the 
vehicle currency; it denominates from 30 percent to 50 percent of the world's 
trade even though the united States itself is directly involved as an importer or 
exporter in less than 15 percent of the world's trade. 
Because the dollar market is the turnpike market, it is also the market of 
choice for any foreign government seeking to stabilize or manipulate the value of 
its currency by buying or selling against the dollar. As a result, the dollar has 
become the world's intervention currency. 
Because the dollar is the vehicle and intervention currency, it is also a 
very convenient currency in which nations can hold at least part of their reserves. 
3 
4 
David Hume, "Of the Balance of Trade," Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary 
(1752), Essay V, Part II, reprinted in International Trade Theory; Hume to 
Ohlin, ed. William R. Allen (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 35. 
J. Williamson, "Exchange-Rate Flexibility and Reserve Use," The Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 78, (1976), #2, pp. 327-39. 
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Hence, the dollar is still the dominant reserve currency. Approximately half of 
the world's $400 billion in international reserves is held in U. S. dollars with 
most of the rest being held in gold. Thus floating exchange rates have not ended 
nor have they greatly attenuated the central role of the dollar. 
The fact that the present international monetary system is dollar-centered 
means that there is no direct way to measure the foreign exchange value of the u.s. 
dollar. Its value can only be approximated by use of index numbers which combine 
the exchange rates of a number of individual currencies into a single index. 
Weights are some measure of international trade. The uncertainties thus intro-
duced may be illustrated by noting that if a very broad index of 107 countries is 
used to measure the change in the value of the U. S. dollar since March 1973,· it 
is seen as almost constant; but if a narrow index of 14 major countries is used, 
it has fallen in value by about 14 percent. More credence is generally given to 
the narrower index, as the broad index includes a lot of exchange-controlled minor 
currencies of countries suffering chronic inflation. In reality the dollar has 
fallen and is falling in international purchasing power relative to other currencies; 
but because the currencies too are inflating, the dollar's purchasing power relative 
to them is falling more slowly than its purchasing power over goods at home and 
abroad. 
Where are we now with regard to theoretical understanding of how the flex-
ible exchange rate system really works? Our current picture of the flexible foreign 
exchange market is that it is a stock-flow equilibrium process. This results from 
the fact that for the dollar and other major currencies, the quantity of liquid 
short-term assets greatly exceeds a day's or a week's or even a month's trade in 
goods and services. Thus over any short period, the dominant forces affecting the 
foreign currency value of the dollar are those which determine the expected real 
return to foreigners from holding it; i.e., short-term interest rates and ex-
pected change in exchange rate. 
Assume initially that the dollar is in equilibrium with regard to the demand 
and supply of both goods and services and with regard to financial claims too. 
It is not tending to rise or to fall against other currencies. Now let U. S. in-
terest rates rise. At an unchanged exchange rate, the goods and services account 
would still be in equilibrium, but the higher yielding short term dollar assets 
would now be an extra good deal and the dollar would be bid up until its expected 
depreciation just offset the extra interest yield. Similarly, if U. S. interest 
rates should fall, the dollar would fall until its expected appreciation just 
equalled its interest yield deficiency. 
To trace a sequence briefly, if from the assumed initial equilibrium point 
the expectations were for a surge in domestic inflation, the purchasing power of 
the dollar for goods and services would be expected to fall, bringing a similar 
drop in the expected future foreign exchange value of the dollar. As a result 
holders of dollars would shift to foreign currency until the decline in the present 
price of the dollar should equal the inflation-induced fall in its future value. 
The outcome would be wide movement in exchange rates as II news II carrying these im-
plications hit the market. 
These changes in relative yields and temporary changes in expected inflation 
rates have effects on exchange rates which are limited by the fixed stock of liquid 
funds that can move. However, the effects of changes in the balance of exports and 
imports are not inherently temporary; they will tend to induce trends in foreign 
exchanges. 
Modeling of this situation involves stock flow analysis with at least some 
dynamic components in the model. That is to say, there are as yet no simple dia-
grammatic or verbal models which can be used to present and illustrate the sit-
uation. Furthermore, although the structure I've just outlined is generally 
accepted among international macroeconomists, there are many, many variations on 
the general theme that give widely varying predictions. 
This is actually all the fault of the econometricians as they keep whimpering 
some garble about how 21 quarters of highly serially correlated data are simply not 
enough to estimate a simultaneous equation, stock-flow system with dynamic elements, 
and they absolutely refuse to reject any hypothesis at all no matter how fanciful. 
This, of course, makes international macroeconomics a veritable playground for the 
"1'11 publish my laundry list if I can get it accepted!! set. 
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Now we can see why some of Friedman's predictions fall short of prescience. 
The balance of payments problem dies but promptly returns reincarnated as an 
exchange rate variability problem. Hence, U. S. Treasury officials still get 
government-paid trips to places like Geneva, Rio de Janeiro, Jamaica, and other 
conference sites. Liquidity in the sense of a shortage of international reserves 
has disappeared just as Friedman predicted, but it has transmigrated into a 
surplus of inconvertible paper dollars worldwide, which foreign governments hold 
with varying degrees of reluctance. As to "discipline,1I we clearly have had a 
highly inflationary economy and if one looks at the money supply growth in the 
united States during the 1970s we see acceleration. Insofar as the fixed rates 
did exert any IIdiscipline ll in early times, it is clearly gone now. 
IIWhen you get exactly what you want, it ':s seldom good for you." Of course 
the present IIdirty float II is not quite what economists of the 1950s and the 1960s 
had in mind when they recommended exchange rate flexibility. But even though we 
know that the real world always makes hash out of elegantly visualized models, we 
perhaps should have done better. 
It is easy to be dissatisified with today's international monetary system. 
If is messy, poorly delineated, not fully understood, and seemingly of little value 
in protecting against inflation. Yet we should remember that the two IIgolden" ages 
discussed previously were separated by 20 very messy years including the great 
depression and that the earlier gold standard era was preceded by the monetary dis-
turbances accompanying the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. Our present 
system is flexible, resilient, adaptable; and it has not noticeably hampered 
growth of world trade. We don't have to love it, but perhaps we had better learn 
to like it because nothing better is presently in the offing. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD GRAIN TRADE 
Alex F. McCalla 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
University of California, Davis 
Introduction 
How many of us have heard statements such as the following? 
IIbread is the staff of life" 
II a bushel for a barrel" 
"we shall not feed the armies of aggressors" 
lithe farm vote is the margin that will determine the outcome" 
"a poor man's bread is his life" 
"regimes rise and fallon the price of a loaf of bread ll 
I could go on and cite more such phrases, but these are sufficient to suggest that 
many commentators have placed grain in a broad political-economic context. Virtually 
every national government makes statements about agricultural policy and most also 
do so about food policy. Is it any wonder then that international commerce among 
nations in grain is often considered in much broader terms than pure economic trans-
actions of a commodity or a set of commodities? 
I will look at the world grain trade in a broader political-economic context. 
I want to view it as a trade which involves many actors -- some large and powerful, 
some small, some public, for example, government; and some private, for example, 
multi-national grain firms; and some with short term economic objectives, others 
with longer and global political objectives. Our understanding of that trade will 
be enhanced if we have a notion of the character of these broader environmental 
conditions that influence trade. 
In order I present summary statistics about the world grain economy; a neo-
classical conception of international markets and structural characteristics of the 
world grain economy; an opposite "government induced residuals ll model; a few policy 
issues leading to a government role; ideas fo+ reorganization; and a note on crucial 
U. S. policy in international grain markets. 
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I confess to being an economist and at best an amateur political scientist 
and historian, caveats that I hope will be borne in mind. 
Nature of the Grain Trade 
Quickly reviewed, first, the volume of world trade in grain in 1979-80 was 195 
million metric tons, the equivalent of one U. S. corn crop or three and a half U. S. 
wheat crops. Secondly, its value at export points was in excess of $35 billion. 
Thirdly, following a t~end toward concentr.ation five or six maj·or countries now 
provide most of all grain exports, and the importance of the United States is in-
creasing. Fourth, in the wheat trade the LDCs (less developed countries) have 
emerged as the dominant importers. Fifth, in the 1970s the centrally planned 
economies entered the wheat and feed grains markets as major importers. Sixth, the 
USSR has switched from being an exporter to a net importer but her forays into the 
market are erratic, with significant destabilizing results. Seventh, the Euro-
pean Community has become a net exporter of wheat but a steady importer of coarse 
grains. Eighth, the most rapid and sustained increases in the demand for wheat and 
feed grains in the world market are corning from OPEC countries and from middle income 
LDCs such as South Korea and Taiwan. Ninth, the total grain trade is increasing 
with the volume of coarse grains going up faster than that of wheat. And tenth, the 
proportion of world wheat production entering international trade has remained con-
stant at between 15 and 20 percent of production but the proportion for coarse grains 
has doubled in the last 20 years from 6 percent to over 13 percent of production. 
These summary statistics help to identify who the potentially important actors 
in the market may be. But we need to go farther if we are to understand what causes 
trade, how prices are set, and who handles the grain and influences outcomes. 
In order to set the stage for the following discussion I present opposing 
models of how grain trade may be viewed. The first is how an economist steeped in 
neoclassical international trade theory might describe an international market. He 
would view it as (1) millions of producers in a hundred plus countries producing 
commodities based on natural resource endowments and comparative advantage; (2) bil-
lions of consumers worldwide whose purchases are influenced by their incomes and 
tastes; and (3) hundreds of thousands of small profit-maximizing merchants and 
handlers whose exchanges over space and time in markets determine prices and allo-
cate supplies among competing demanders. This is the image of a freely working 
international market where the basic forces of supply and demand interact to form 
prices, within a benign structure of marketing institutions and of minimal govern-
ment policies to set the rules of the game. 
The second extreme model of the world grain trade runs as follows. According 
to it, grain production in all countries is seen as responding to price and other 
incentives which are heavily influenced, directly or indirectly, by government 
policy. Governments in addition set trade restrictions such as quotas, tariffs, 
and export subsidies to insulate domestic markets from changes in international 
markets. Therefore, the international market in grains is the interaction of sets 
of policy-induced residuals from national markets, and the principal objective is 
to export domestic instability. Interposed on these domestically induced residuals 
are large scale multi-national trading firms that function as intermediaries between 
actors, by maximizing profits based on volume and price instability. This set of 
interactions between national governments, state traders, and large trading firms 
produces price outcomes based on power and political objectives rather than tradi-
tional economic factors. 
The reality of the grain market is different. Here are a few structural 
characteristics of the world grain trade. First, 95 percent of international wheat 
transactions involve state traders on at least one side of the transaction (as ex-
porter or importer). About one-third of the wheat trade is state trading on both 
sides, directly by governments or through some government agency with monopoly 
powers such as the Canadian Wheat Board. Secondly, over 40 percent of world feed 
grain trade involves state traders on at least one side of the transaction. Thirdly, 
although firm statistics are hard to come by, it is generally accepted that five 
mUlti-national grain firms account for about 80 to 90 percent of U. S. grain ex-
ports and for more than three-quarters of the world grain trade. Two firms, by 
their own admission, account for 50 percent of U. S. and world trade. Fourth, 
these same five firms are involved in virtually all state trading activities at 
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least as fobbers, that is, as firms that handle the logistical functions after 
price-quantity bargains are struck by state trading agencies. Fifth, five countries, 
the united States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, and France, account for over 85 
percent of world wheat exports. Canada, the United States, and Australia alone 
account for 70 percent. The United States alone has 40 percent. Sixth, six 
countries export 80 percent of all coarse grains going into world trade, and the 
United States contributes more than 50 percent. Seventh, every country involved 
in the grain trade supports domestic agriculture through price supports and ac-
companying trade restrictions. In fact, most isolate domestic prices completely or 
partially from world prices. Recent work by Professor Bredahl of UMC documents 
this through the notion of transmission elasticities. Eighth, it therefore follows 
that grain trade policy is a significant political variable in the domestic policy 
concerns of virtually all participants in the market. Often involved are attempts, 
in effect, to export domestic instability in price and production. The USSR is 
a classic example of this. The Soviets seek to prevent events in the international 
market from disrupting their domestic policy objectives. They consider grain 
trading as a part of diplomatic or international relations, and not just a matter 
of commercial trade. Here in the united States we need only to note the U. S. em-
bargo against the· USSR in retaliation for Afghanistan, and our need to expand 
agricultural exports to satisfy our voracious appetite for oil. 
These structural variables do not necessarily prove that the world grain mar-
ket is not highly competitive and freely working. But these features of the grain 
trade raise questions in my mind as to the influence of government policy and the 
potential market power of private traders. Hence the two approaches to analyzing 
the world grain trade offered above. 
Which of these two conceptions of international mar~ets is correct? Neither is 
entirely correct because each over simplifies an extremely complex set of trading 
relationships. Clearly the free trade model omits all distortions arising from 
the exercise of market power and from political events such as trade embargoes. On 
the other hand, the second model of "government induced residuals" does not take 
into account basic considerations such as resource endowments (especially the capa-
city to produce grain efficiently), the level of technology, market structure, the 
level of income, size and make-up of populations, and, most importantly, relative 
prices. 
Probably the true situation involves elements of both models. Comparative 
advantage, technology, production efficiency, and resource endowments do set broad 
boundaries as to who is best able to produce and sell grain. Similarly, the over-
powering variables of population growth, tastes, income, and prices go a long way 
toward explaining the demand for grain and for bread and meat produced from it. 
Obviously, for trade over long distances both private traders and governments are 
involved. 
But it is equally true that governments in pursuit of (1) domestic price and 
income objectives; (2) trade policies to protect domestic industries; (3) tar-
iff revenue earnings; and (4) global or regional political objectives, do create 
distortions in any otherwise freely working market. These government distortions 
are of two types: those which change the structure of the market (the most fre-
quently cited example is the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community), 
and those which distort prices within a given structure (as examples, embargoes, 
tariffs, quotas, export subsidies, and quantitative restrictions to trade). Private 
traders that are large enough to exercise market power also can distort structure 
and prices. 
The Political Economy of World Grain Trade 
It should now be established that the reality of the world grain trade is 
one where governments and private actors intervene to distort a freely working 
international market. At this point many commentators become prescriptive and 
yearn for, yea preach for, a return to the glories of free trade. But is such an 
approach realistic when we have more than 50 years of continuous market interven-
tion behind us? Would analysts not be better off to try to construct realistic ana-
lytical models? In this section I trY . to give some illustrations of why governments 
do what they do. Their interventions may be politically rational even though they 
do violence to economists' simplistic notions. It seems clear that the older ap-
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proach of political economy is a more valid approach to understanding the grain 
trade. 
I comment separately on domestic politics and global politics. 
First, domestic political intervention. Policy influencing the grain trade 
can involve direct support of farm prices and farmers' incomes; policies to main-
tainlowfood prices; and general economic policies which use management of trade 
relationships to accomplish national economic and political objectives. Let me 
treat each in turn. 
1. Farm Price and Income Support. Most developed countries have long tried 
to manage supply to reduce the instability of farm prices and increase farm income. 
In doing so governments have enacted trade policies which prevent external (world 
market) fluctuations from disrupting domestic objectives. Domestic policy of this 
kind is inherently protectionist. For importing countries the task is quite simple. 
European countries for over a century have used trade policies, primarily tariffs, 
as the basic instruments of domestic farm policy. Quotas, variable levies, and 
other quantitative restrictions give more absolute protection than tariffs. 
Exporting countries find the task more complicated. Supply management and/or 
export dumping are necessary companions to domestic price supports. Various 
schemes are employed. The United States has used overseas surplus disposal by 
PL-480, export subsidies, two price systems, direct payments to farmers, and manage-
ment of the land input. Canada, Australia, and sometimes Argentina and Brazil have 
turned to state trading agencies, multiple exchange rates, and bilateral pricing 
agreements. Of course, import restrictions are added to protect the higher internal 
prices. 
These increasingly complicated regimes of domestic support with accompanying 
trade restrictions are adopted because farmers are perceived as important politically 
and deserving of economic support. I would argue that the overwhelming evidence is 
that despite diminishing numbers of true farmers, little political action to alter 
these basic commitments is likely for the foreseeable future, as the recent u.S. 
election verifies. But as the international market becomes more important rela-
tive to the domestic one, these programs become more expensive as well as compli-
cated. Even so, the international market is still treated as a residual, in that 
international ramifications get attention only after domestic parameters are set. 
For at least the near term, domestic price support programs seem to be a political 
reality in world trade. 
2. Domestic Food Costs. The interests of urban consumers are generally the 
opposite of farmers'; they want low prices. Governments attempt, for obvious sur-
vival reasons, to be kind to consumers. Thus, the inevitable and insoluble con-
flict between food and farm price policy is joined. 
Here one must divide countries into three camps for analysis: (1) exporters, 
(2) high income importers, and (3) the rest of the world including the centrally 
planned economies and the developing countries (the LDCS) . Each approaches the 
problem differently. Developed country exporters of grain have typically attempted 
to support farm income by modest domestic supply management but even more via in-
come transfers to farmers while keeping domestic prices reasonably low. High in-
come importers have used tariffs and other trade restrictions to maintain farm and 
food prices at levels relatively higher than in exporting countries. 
So long as personal income grew at a faster rate than inflation in general 
and food prices in particular, consumers were not too disruptive. In the 1970s 
economic slowdown coupled with commodity price inflation threw the delicate balance 
between food and farm prices into disarray. Farm policies were thrust into the 
national political and economic arena. I will return to this point later. 
The rest of the world -- centrally planned and LDCs -- have dealt with the 
food-farm price dilemma in a remarkably similar way. In general, the lower the 
level of per . capita income, the higher the proportion of that income is spent on 
food. Thus, food prices are critical as major wage goods, as factors in real in-
come growth, and as elements in the survival of government. We can recall food 
riots and strikes in Bangkok in 1976, Cairo in 1978, and Poland in 1956, 1970, 1976, 
and 1980, following efforts by governments to increase food prices. Therefore, re-
tail food prices must be kept low and basically constant. As long as cheap and/or 
subsidized imports (such as PL-480) are available, both the LDCs and the centrally 
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planned economies could use the international market as an increasingly important 
alternative to domestic production. In those countries domestic production incen-
tives via increased farm prices could be deferred at substantial savings to the 
national budgets. In the 1970s when international commodity prices rose fast, 
those strategies ran into trouble, principally because of foreign exchange short-
ages. Most countries responded by trying to expand domestic production via in-
creased farm prices, while subsidizing food prices. The result was staggering in-
creases in budgetary costs. It appears, for example, that both Poland and Egypt 
spend more on food subsidies than on the nation's defense. Management of commodity 
trade was found necessary, as food was imported by direct purchase by government or 
by state trading agencies. As these countries now dominate the world wheat market, 
national policy greatly influences import demand. 
3. National Economic and Political Objectives. When all goes well --with do-
mestic prices reasonably stable and in line with world prices and real income grow-
ing -- agricultural policy can be viewed as benign. If any of those variables acts 
up, agricultural policy becomes national rather than sectoral. For most of the 
1970s two or even all three were aggravated. Higher grain prices translated to 
higher bread and meat prices in spite of subsidies, which themselves became costly 
during inflation. The situation was politically distasteful to most politicians. 
In addition, OPEC caused problems for balance of payments for all oil im-
porters (most of the world). Exporters of grain then sought to expand exports to 
pay for oil imports. Importers of both grain and oil sought to economize on buy-
ing of grain in order to pay for oil but ran into extreme political protest when 
they attempted to raise food prices. The result was either a growing budget deficit 
or a foreign exchange deficit, both sources of economic or political instability. 
This is not to say that the grain trade is a central causative agent in these 
broader national issues. Rather my message is that if (1) grain exports and imports 
are residuals of domestic food and agricultural policy and (2) if these policies 
during periods of stagflation and international price instability are escalated to 
national policy issues, then the pure economics of grain commodity trade pales 
in the face of powerful domestic objectives. The common outcome , is to attempt 
to stabilize internally by exporting instability into the international grain 
market. 
If one now adds national diplomatic efforts such as U. S. attempts to barter 
grain for oil in 1975, the 1980 grain embargo, increasing numbers of bilateral 
agreements made for political as well as economic reasons, and food shipments made 
for defense and alliance objectives (e.g., to Egypt and Israel), one begins to get 
a flavor of the character of policies influencing the grain trade as a result of 
domestic political intervention. 
Secondly I take up global politics. For present purposes I refer to inter-
actions among nations whose sovereign interests are enhanced by cooperation or con-
flict with one or more other nations. Few if any issues are treated as global to 
the extent that nations subordinate domestic objectives to them. This is not a 
cynical vie'f . ., but my amateur attempt at realism. 
A few global issues relating to the grain trade are diplomatic retaliations 
(U. S. grain embargo against the Soviet Union), reinforcement of political alli-
ances (PL-480), economic retaliation (a proposed grain OPEC), recapturing of eco-
nomic and political stability (world food security and the UNCTAD proposals) . 
1. Diplomatic Retaliation. Using grain embargoes for diplomatic retaliation 
is more attractive in proportion to the dependence of the target country. Clearly 
the USSR appeared to have become increasingly 'dependent on the world grain market 
in the 1970s. Thus an embargo in retaliation for Afghanistan seemed plausible to 
President Carter. Unlike most IIweaponll proposals involving food it would not 
cause the poor and hungry, but the political regime, to suffer. It failed in 
large measure because other exporters were less diligent in cooperating and be-
cause the complexity of the international grain trade makes enforcement virtually 
impossible. Perhaps this is one piece of evidence that using grain as a diplomatic 
weapon is a questionable approach. Our sanctions against Iran seem to have 
suffered the same fate. 
2. Reinforcing Political Alliances. Patterns of PL-480 shipments are prob-
ably partially explainable by whom we perceive as friends and whom we do not. Food 
aid has many desirable characteristics. It has a humanitarian element and in some 
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cases, e.g., India in 1965-66, it may have prevented mass starvation. It also has 
the potential of developing markets, e.g., Japan. And it can be one arrow in the 
diplomatic quiver to reward newly friendly nations such as, for example, Egypt. 
It is clear that these objectives have been intertwined with policies for su~plus 
disposal. It is hard to unravel precisely how this element of global politics bore 
on the grain trade, but there were some effects, at least in the 1960s. 
3. Economic Retaliation. The cry "a bushel for a barrel" is clearly couched 
in terms of economic retaliation against, in this instance, OPEC. The surface 
attraction is clear. Most countries other than OPEC are oil importers. A time-
honored potential response to monopoly is countervailing power. Yet even if grain 
exporters could get their act together to enforce a grain cartel against OPEC, its 
impact would be limited because most OPEC countries are sparsely settled and, 
therefore, the monopoly revenue to be gained is limited. Furthermore, foreign ex-
chahge is not in short supply in OPEC countries; they are not highly vulnerable. 
A more frequently used tool of economic retaliation in the grain trade is to 
use price cutting or special terms to punish competitors or steal customers. I do 
not have space to document these actions in detail but clearly they have taken 
place and they will continue to do so. 
4. Capturing International Monopoly Profits. The notion of a grain export 
cartel is seductive. Most developed country exporters support farm prices above 
world levels, thereby inducing increased production which puts downward pressure on 
world grain prices. Most developed importers such as Japan and the EC use quotas and 
variable levies to raise domestic prices above world levels, collecting substantial 
import taxes in the process. Why shouldn't exporters capture those benefits by 
raising their prices to importers' internal levels? My colleague Andy Schmitz and I 
have looked into the implications of a grain export cartel. We conclude that there 
is no universally compelling theoretical reason why a cartel could not work. The 
free rider problem can be offset by a properly formed cartel. Past experience of 
cartels is mixed but many have succeeded in substantially enhancing export earnings. 
OPEC is one such example. Our empirical analysis suggests that the gains to ex-
porters could be substantial. The crucial issues appear to be operational --
namely, can exporting nations agree to cooperate and not cheat and can institutions 
be created which would allow one to work? Here the issue of the role of private 
traders in the logistics of the trade becomes crucial. The grain cartel remains 
an intrinsically interesting scenario. 
5. Dampening Potential Economic and Political Instability. The issues here 
are obvious. Increasing disparities between rich and poor nations ar~ potentially 
destabiliziQg to the world order. Hunger and starvation exist simultaneously 
with surpluses and overeating. Thus we have a continuing dialogue on a World Food 
Security program and proposals to transfer income from developed countries to de-
veloping countries via commodity agreements as proposed by UNCTAD. These are 
laudable objectives but to date we have seen little progress on either front. Per-
haps the reason is that economic development assistance is difficult and if too 
successful runs counter to the interests of donor countries. 
These discussions of global politics have been couched in terms of governmental 
international relations. However, to be complete in our discussion of the global 
politics of grain we must at least mention the privately owned multi-national grain 
firms which are so centrally entwined in that trade. Dan Morgan in his fascinating 
book Merchants of Grain has characterized these five firms, owned by seven 
families, as shadowy entities, operating outside of any national or international 
authority, who control the world's food supply. While that may be too strong a 
conclusion, it nevertheless remains true that the private houses playa pivotal 
role in the grain trade. It is further true that we don't know very much about 
them. On one extreme they characterize themselves as pure merchants, interested in 
facilitating an efficient trade in return for modest profits. Others have been 
less kind in their imputations of power and gross motives. How they interact with 
governments pursuing national objectives is a fascinating and little understood 
arrangement. Any true "model" of the political economy of the world grain trade 
must include them. 
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Some Remaining Issues 
One further issue/tg recognize past attempts to organize the international 
wheat market via multilateral commodity agreements. The many international wheat 
agreements beginning after WWII were attempts by exporters and importers to set 
price bands for a degree of stabilization. They appeared to work when the market 
was stable and when the dominant exporters -- the U. S. and Canada -- found it in 
their interest to provide an umbrella over the world market. When either of these 
conditions was violated, they broke down. I suspect that would be the fate of any 
future arrangement. 
A second remaining issue is the role of U. S. policy in world grain markets. 
The dominance of the united States in both the world wheat and feed grain markets 
means that U. S. grain policy, as well as general economic and diplomatic policy, 
greatly influences world markets. Even though the united States claims not to 
exercise the tremendous potential market power she has, she nevertheless sets 
bounds on the market. I would argue, for example, that the loan rate sets an 
absolute floor under world grain prices. I would further argue that the call price 
in the farmer held reserve sets a ceiling on prices as long as reserves exist. Fur-
ther decisions with respect to target prices and acreage restrictions have direct 
impacts on world markets. As long as the united States operates a private trading 
system within a policy environment which does not differentiate domestic from inter-
national prices, this will remain the case. All too often I fear U. S. policy 
makers set domestic policy for domestic reasons without fully understanding the 
profound impacts they have on world markets. 
Concluding Comments 
I have argued that to view the world grain trade in purely economic, commodity-
oriented terms is simplistic. To couch one's analysis of the market strictly in po-
litical terms is equally simplistic. The true "model," if there be one, recognizes 
both dimensions. But I hope I have demonstrated the complexity of the trade, inter-
woven with domestic and international economic and political objectives and with 
large trading firms. Model building is difficult. At the same time it is fascin-
ating. I hope I have shared some of my fascination and have conveyed some useful 
notions which will allow us to better understand the political economy of the world 
grain trade. 
WORLD AND U. S. AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 
J. Dawson Ahalt 
Chairman, World Food & Agricultural Outlook & Situation Board 
United States Department of Agriculture 
The world supply situation for grains, oilseeds, and cotton is significantly 
tighter now than a year ago. In fact, prospects tightened further during the fall. 
We are facing an abrupt turnaround from the 1976-79 period of relatively 
ample world supplies of those commodities to the tightest supply situation in the 
past five years. 
Clearly, higher prices for crops, livestock, and retail food are in prospect 
for 1981. The overall impact of this altered world agricultural situation will 
depend on a number of critical variables in the coming year: rates of economic 
growth and their implications for inflation and consumer demand, the ' scale of ad-
justments by U. S. and other livestock producers to tight feedstuff supplies, the 
nature of policy changes by the new Administration, and, perhaps more than any 
other factor, the weather. 
Grains 
World grain production in 1980 was estimated as of early October at 1.45 bil-
lion metric tons of wheat, coarse grains and rough rice. This represents some 
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recovery from the 1979 harvest but is considerably below the 1978 record. Moreover, 
indications that the 1980 Soviet grain crop was under 200 million tons coupled with 
continued dry weather in Australia and Argentina mean that the final outturn (1980-
81) will be even lower. Global consumption of grains in 1980-81 will probably be 
the second highest ever, exceeding production by a wide margin. We expect, then, 
the largest stock drawdown since 1972. The global carryover of grain was estimated 
in October to drop from the 192.5 million tons brought into the year to 155.2 mil-
lion by the end of the 1980-81 season. The ratio of stocks to consumption -- a 
critical factor in price determination -- is falling below 11 percent for the first 
time since 1974-75. This will be well below the fairly comfortable ratio of 15.3 
percent the world enjoyed two years ago. 
It is worth noting that, even with its own sharp drawdown, the United States' 
projected 1980-81 stocks/use ratio for all grains is estimated at 17 percent, still 
well above the 1973-74 ratio of 12~ percent. In the rest of the world, the stocks/ 
use is projected at 8 percent for 1980-81 compared with 11 percent in 1973-74. 
Thus conditions are much tighter outside the United States than here at home. 
Although the present world grain situation means higher prices, it does not 
suggest widespread food shortages. In fact, the situation is not nearly so tight 
for food grains as for feed grains. The world wheat harvest in 1980-81 is shaping 
up to be the second largest ever and should facilitate expected record consumption 
levels with a stock drawdown of less than 7 million tons. We also expect records 
for both production and use of rice globally this year, with no appreciable re-
duction in stocks. The stocks/use ratio for wheat may decline from 18 to 16 per-
cent, and the rice ratio will hold steady at around 9~ percent. 
Record U. S. wheat production in 1980 will support gains in domestic use and 
record exports with no decline in stocks. Moreover, indications are that winter 
wheat plantings in the fall of 1980 were expanded to a new record acreage. With 
average or better weather the 1981 harvest will be large. U. S. rice production 
also was record large in 1980, but big gains in domestic use and exports will draw 
stocks down somewhat. 
Because of sharply reduced 1980 feed grain crops here and elsewhere, the United 
States and some other countries will have to curtail livestock production. World 
feed grain production was down about l~ percent from 1979, but consumption is expected 
to move to a record high some 30 million tons above the 716-million-ton harvest. The 
drawdown in global feed grain stocks, from 89 million ton 59 million, will be the 
largest on record and will reduce the stocks/use ratio from 12 percent to less than 
8 percent. 
The United States accounted for most of the drop in world feed grain pro-
duction in 1980 and will probably feel the most effect from it. The drought cut 
U. S. feed grain output nearly 20 percent to about 193 million tons. The united 
States began the 1980-81 season with its largest feed grain stocks in 16 years, but 
will end the year with its smallest since 1966-67 as the carryover falls from 
54 million tons to 24 million. The farmer-owned reserve of feed grains, which stood 
at 17.5 million tons coming into the year, will probably be gone by the end of 
1980-81. 
One effect of the drop in U. S. feed grain stocks will be to bring the U. S. 
share of global stocks more in line with its share of world production. The stock 
share should slide from 60 percent to about 40 percent, with the production share 
at around 27 percent. 
Domestic feed use is likely to drop about 9 million tons in 1980-81, to 
126 million, but that level would still be well above the 1974-77 average of 113 
million tons. 
We are still projecting that the United States will register its sixth 
straight record volume of feed grain exports in 1980-81, perhaps 73 million tons. 
Oilseeds 
Even more than in the grain situation, a major drop in production in the 
United States is the key factor in the 1980-81 world oilseed outlook. The drought-
reduced U. S. soybean harvest accounts for virtually all of a l3~ percent drop in 
world soybean production. 
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As in the grain situation, large world and U. S. stocks of soybeans at the 
outset of 1980-81 will support some moderate further gains in consumption. U. S. 
stocks, which account for most of the world's, will be drawn down to half their 
record 1979-80 carryout of 9.8 million tons. The U. S. soybean stock/use ratio 
will also be halved, to 8~ percent, as consumption and exports both decline slightly. 
This compares with a low point in 1972-73 of less than 5 percent. 
Cotton 
World cotton production in 1980-81 is estimated at 63.5 million bales, down 
about 3 percent. As in the case of soybeans, the principal reduction was in the 
united States, where output fell 10 percent. Consumption is expected to decline 
only marginally, however, although world trade is projected to drop because of 
lower U. S. exports. Global ending stocks are projected to fall about 2~ million 
bales, to the lowest level in 20 years. 
In the united States, stocks will fall only about 200,000 bales as a sharp 
cutback in exports and some reduction in domestic mill use will partly compensate 
for the poor crop. 
Trade 
U. S. agricultural exports hit their tenth straight record in fiscal 1980, 
surpassing $40 billion. Despite the disappointing harvests here this year, we ex-
pect exports to expand further in 1981i they could run well into the mid-$40-
billion range. 
Fiscal 1980 als0 saw some important shifts in U. S. agricultural export 
patterns. Although the suspension of sales to the Soviets that began last January 
has limited our shipments to that country, we have made some big gains in the 
Chinese and Mexican markets. Exports continued to expand to the rapid-growth de-
veloping countries of East Asia, North Africa, and the Mideast. U. S. exporters 
also significantly increased sales to some of their traditionally major markets 
-- Western and Eastern Europe, and Japan. 
The expansion in the Chinese and Mexican markets this year is particularly 
worth noting. China has been a relatively erratic buyer and Mexico small but grow-
ing. Both have the potential of growing considerably -- China because of its enor~ 
mous population, a fifth of the world's, and Mexico because of its expanding oil 
wealth. Both countries appear to be committed to improving the diets of their people 
and are looking to imports to assist them on this goal until they can expand their 
own agricultural production. 
The fluctuations in China's imports from the united States over the past 
several years -- ranging, for example from no wheat in 1977-78 to a projected 
6.5 million tons in 1980-81 -- will be ironed out over the next four years by the 
bilateral agreement signed in October. The agreement will put minimum Chinese 
grain purchases through 1984-85 at 6-9 million tons annually. 
The united States also entered a bilateral arrangement with Mexico in 1980, 
though the period covered was only one year. The United States may supply Mexico 
with as much as 10 million tons of agricultural commodities by the end of calendar 
1980, 2~ times the volume Mexico purchased from the united States in 1979. 
The role of bilateral arrangements in U. S. agricultural trade should not, 
however, be overemphasized. The actual trading on our side remains in the hands 
of private U. S. exporters. Trade with the three agreement countries -- USSR, 
China, and Mexico -- accounted for about one eighth of the value of 1980 U. S. 
agricultural exports. Agreements, particularly in the case of the USSR and China, 
do help remove some of the uncertainties involved in dealing with nations with 
large state trading systems. 
The chart sketches the change in make-up of export markets for u. S. grain 
the last nine years. Computed from export values, the chart shows the decline in 
share of traditional markets of Japan, Canada, and Western Europe from 48 percent 
in 1970-71 to 36 percent in 1979-80. The centrally controlled economies of Eastern 
Europe, the USSR, and Peoples Republic of China took only four percent in the 
earlier year but 21 percent in 1979-80. Latin America, with Mexico in the lead, 
has been a growing market in both absolute and relative terms. Notable, though, is 
the drop in proportion of sales to South Asia, particularly India. 
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The longer term outlook for U. S. agricultural trade is good. Rising popula-
tion and income throughout the world, along with a desire to upgrade diets with 
more meat, milk, and eggs, assures the U. S. of growing demand for its agricultural 
goods, especially feedstuffs. 
Over the past 20 years, grain production outside the united States increased 
an average of 21 million tons per year. Consumption during that same period rose 
25 million tons annually. The gap between foreign production and consumption of 
grains stood at an average 96 million tons for 1977-79 and U. S. grain exports 
averaged 85 million tons for those three years. With the foreign production-con-
sumption gap growing at a pace of 4 million tons per year, the predominance of the 
U. S. role in global agricultural trade seems assured. However, continued problems 
with many nations' restrictive trade policies, coupled with fluctuations in economic 
growth, pose a series of challenges for agriculture in the years ahead. 
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PROBABLE, · POSSIBLE, AND UNPREDICTABLE 
Don Paarlberg 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
Emeritus, Purdue University 
American agriculture has entered the international dimension. After these 
decades of looking inward we have rediscovered our comparative advantage and are 
looking to the export market. Partly by chance and partly by design, the United 
States has become the key nation in a developing pattern of global food interde-
pendence. 
I propose to lift up and consider briefly some of the policy issues that re-
late to our new role, to consider alternative courses that might be followed, and 
to venture some judgments as to what path we might take. The time dimension I am 
considering is the decade of. the 1980s. 
Basic to any outlook are the assumptions made. These are my assumptions: 
Weather will be average, both in central tendency and departures therefrom. 
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Productivity in agriculture (that is, output per unit of input) will continue to 
advance at much the same rate as it has during the three previous decades. 
We will refrain from deep acreage cuts. 
On the whole we will price our export products competitively, as we have been 
doing in recent years. 
We will generally follow the path to which we are now committed as to the con-
version of grain into liquid fuel, so as to make notable but not massive cuts in 
our supply of exportable grain, thus using for alcohol perhaps 3 or 4 percent of 
our grain supply by 1985. 
The great powers will succeed in avoiding major confrontation. 
Access to oil supplies in the Persian Gulf area will continue to be available. 
To the degree that these assumptions prove to be in error this analysis is 
flawed. That is, it will be so unless I am saved by the analyst's friend, compen-
sating error. 
The policy issues I lift up are seven in number. 
1. Under what kind of institutional framework will agricultural trade be con-
ducted? Specifically, the questions are these: will the great bulk of the trade 
be conducted by private entrepreneurial firms operating in a competitive market 
system, as in the past? Or will we put the Commodity Credit Corporation into the 
export business, as Congressman Weaver proposed? Will we join with the Canadians 
to set up a grain cartel as OPEC has done with oil? will there be more internation-
al commodity agreements? Will there be more bilateral deals? will there be a 
system of internationally held grain reserves? will food aid increasingly be pro-
vided through the World Food Program of the FAO? 
The best answers to these questions are not obtained either from the zealots 
for internationalism nor from those who look with misgiving on any international 
label. The most useful answers are given by those who examine our experience. 
Experience shows that international cooperation in some areas has been useful: 
monitoring the weather, crop reporting, agreements on grades and standards, and ex-
change of information on national policies with respect to the major crops. The 
International Cotton Advisory Committee and the International Wheat Council reflect 
this successful experience. 
Other kinds of activity that may appear to be suited for multilateral control 
apparently are not yet truly ready. Efforts to set up an international grain reserve 
have failed three separate times in the past 40 years. International commodity agree-
ments have had a spotty experience. Of the multitude proposed and the scores launched 
only five are now in existence and these have proved rather ineffective in regu-
lating world markets. On the other hand, in dealing with the monopsonistic 
traders of the Communist world, bilateral agreements, with the American side of the 
transaction mostly in the hands of the private trade, have been useful. 
Up to now no nation that I know of has been willing to surrender its sov-
ereignty over its own agricultural policy to any international body. Certainly the 
United States and Europe have not. 
From this review of experience certain principles emerge. Unilaterally we 
develop our domestic commodity programs, showing some awareness of their inter-
national significance. Bilaterally we work out trade agreements with certain 
countries, based on unique circumstances. Multilaterally we deal with tariffs and 
other issues that involve minimal impairment of our national sovereignty. Some 
undertakings, such as food aid and agricultural development, we administer simul-
taneously on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. We have not established a 
North American grain cartel. We have thought there are better ways of coping with 
the OPEC combine than emulating it. 
The evidence is that multilateral undertakings whose major attribute is 
mutual gain are likely to be accepted. Those whose dominant feature is transfer 
of control over real assets or the major subordination of market forces to central-
ized decision-making are marginal. Those that require outright and visible sacri-
fice of national sovereignty are likely to be rejected. 
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These principles, I think, will continue to apply. The international sector 
is not well adapted to ideologues. 
An enormous amount of time and energy will be expended in the years ahead in 
discussing proposed changes in the institutional arrangements under which inter-
national trade in agricultural products is conducted. I believe that most of the 
needed institutions, private and public, are in place and that most of the trade 
will be conducted within them. 
2. Will farm products be used as a tool of diplomacy? The specific questions 
here are: will we embargo exports in an effort to persuade other nations to see 
things our way? Will we use food aid as a means of lubricating our diplomatic 
initiatives? Will we cut off agricultural trade with the Corrununist nations to show 
our disapproval of their internal policies or their international adventures? 
Here again a review of the past is informative. The most recent experience 
concerns the 1980 grain embargo imposed on the Soviet union. It may have been 
considered a political necessity, but it caused economic heartburn. Certainly it 
did not get the Soviet union to withdraw from Afghanistan. And it was launched 
under conditions that were most conducive to success, when the USSR had harvested 
one bad crop and was about to plant another. The Soviets' ability to get grain 
from alternative suppliers and via transshipment blunted the weapon. 
Experience with using food to support diplomatic purposes is mixed. Food 
aid was used successfully by Secretary Kissinger in 1974 in support of our efforts 
to promote Arab-Israeli disengagement in the Middle East. During 1965-68 we sought 
to use food aid in persuading India to support our policies in Southeast Asia but 
were not successful. 
During the past several decades we have vacillated on agricultural trade with 
Communist nations. At various times we have vigorously rejected such trade, under-
taken it apologetically, interrupted it reluctantly, and pursued it selectively. 
While there is little evidence that these policy changes have visibly altered the 
decisions of the Corrununist countries, our various lunges have yielded some political 
advantages within the United States. Therein we probably have the explanation as 
to why they were made. 
To say that food would not be used as a diplomatic tool in the coming decade 
would be to forego the gains, however small, that could be achieved thereby. And it 
would deny to our public servants an initiative they have found politically useful. 
But to think that IIfood power" is comparable to lIoil power" is an error. To suggest 
that the international influence we have lost in recent years could be recaptured by 
withholding or supplying American food is to overestimate the strength of a feeble 
weapon. We will probably continue sporadic use of this tool in the years ahead, the 
consequences being more political than economic and more internal than external. 
3. Will embargoes be imposed in order to hold down the price of food in the 
united States? This was the purpose of the embargoes imposed during the price 
surge of the 1970s. 
A possible scenario is this: inflation is in the bloodstream and is likely 
to continue. Agricultural productivity will level off somewhat in the decade ahead. 
Nominal prices thus will rise rapidly and real prices will creep up. Consumer con-
cern about the food bill will therefore escalate. Non-farmers, who now outnumber 
farmers 36 to I, will demand action to hold down the grocery bill. A visible way 
of attempting this would be to curtail exports, slugging the domestic market with 
greater supplies. 
What credibility should be given to this scenario? Talk about a diminished 
rate of growth in agricultural productivity is speculation, not a fact. Other 
elements in this scenario are more soundly based. Unfortunately, this scenario 
must be accorded sufficient respect that it cannot be dismissed. 
For 40 years food price policy was one dimensional; the purpose was to keep 
prices from falling below some specified level, but to apply no restraint on the 
upper end of the range. A reasonable judgment is that food price policy is be-
coming symmetrical. That is, there are likely to be efforts to reduce the amplitude 
of price fluctuations by checking the extremes at the upper as well as the lower 
ends. The grain reserve is likely to be operated with these objectives. Turning 
the export market off and on is likely to be proposed as a technique for stabilizing 
prices internally. The Europeans do this. 
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Farmer objections to this policy are clear. It would inject the government 
deeply into what has been private activity. The threat of embargo would hang over 
the market like a cloud, depressing prices. Long term export market building would 
be inhibited; our customers would feel they could not count on us as a supplier. 
Nationally, we would be foregoing needed foreign exchange. In the inter-
national field we would be injuring nations, many of them poor, who have become de-
pendent upon us for food. It would be a denial of our leadership role in global 
food interdependence. 
This could be a real worry during the decade ahead. 
4. will there be a trend toward protectionism? In 1930 the Congress passed an 
act raising tariffs to an extremely high level. The action had serious adverse 
consequences. Beginning in 1934 there have been six rounds of multilateral tariff 
reductions. Before these negotiations, tariff revenues equalled 18 percent of the 
value of imports. By 1977 tariff revenues equalled only five percent of the value 
of imports, about one-fourth as much as forty-three years earlier. This astounding 
reduction in tariff barriers was very successful. It was accompanied by a four-
fold increase in the real volume of world trade in agricultural products and by a 
phenomenal rise in the standards of living of virtually all trading nations. 
But now we seem to have come to the end of trade liberalization. The last 
round of trade negotiations achieved very little in the way of reducing trade 
barriers; the most that can be said for it is that it kept the initiative from 
passing to the protectionists. 
Protectionism is now on the rise. The labor unions, fearing for their jobs, 
seek to keep out foreign goods. Dairymen, growers of sugar beets and cane, cattle-
men, soybean growers, and producers of specialty crops try to check imports. The 
worsening trade balance gives credibility to those who seek to keep out foreign 
goods. The energy problem demonstrates how vulnerable nations can be if they are 
deeply dependent on foreign sources for strategic supplies. 
The argument is made that food is somewhat unique among the articles traded 
internationally and that a c.ertain degree of self-sufficiency is important. Twice 
during the memory of living persons Europe was nearly brought to her knees by 
reliance on imported food. Japan had a similar experience during World War II. 
Is food production in other countries uniquely in need of protection? Are 
American exports of food to be curtailed for this reason? Will American farmers who 
feel threatened by foreign competition succeed in obtaining protection, thus setting 
off retaliatory restrictions on our exports? A long-held hope of the farm interests 
is that foreign markets for American farm products can be opened by providing access 
to the American market for additional foreign manufactured goods. With the rise of 
protectionism, how real is this hope? 
The best available answers to these questions are not reassuring to those 
interested in expanding the export market for farm products. Unfortunately the 
protectionist mood, which is world-wide, comes at a time when American agriculture 
is poised to utilize its comparative advantage by increasing farm e~ports. 
There will be battles over these matters during the 1980s. Unremitting 
efforts to check protectionist tendencies will be necessary in the decade ahead. 
It will take all the ingenuity of which we are capable to hold the liberal trade 
gains achieved since 1934. 
5. What will be the role of international food aid in the decade ahead? How 
big an item will international food aid be? This will undoubtedly be an issue. 
There is, I think, a way of approximating an answer to that question. During the 
years when we were supporting prices of farm products above the competitive level, 
we priced our export crops out of the world market. They piled up in government 
hands. To move them, we resorted to concessional terms. We gave them away. We 
sold them for foreign currency, and we sold them for dollars on the basis of long-
term subsidized credit. In 1956, 38 percent of our exports went out under Public 
Law 480 or other concessional programs. These exports were rationalized in various 
ways: as surplus disposal, food aid, market building, fighting communism, and the 
like. Undeniably these concessional expo+ts boosted overseas movement of American 
farm products above what they would otherwise have been, given the price policies 
of that time. 
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When we allowed our prices to be competitive the need for concessional pro-
grams diminished. By 1976, the proportion of our exports moving under concessional 
programs had fallen to five percent, one-seventh as much as 20 years earlier. 
The fact that we continued concessional programs at all during the high prices 
and the reduced supplies of the mid-seventies is evidence that there is a genuine 
element of food aid in our agricultural exports. Very likely the size of the pro-
gram during that period is a measure of that authentic purpose. 
There will be strong arguments about international food aid during the coming 
decade. Supporting it will be many church people, considerable numbers of warm-
hearted citizens, the internationalists, many farmer-producers of the commodities 
concerned, and the government people who administer the programs. Opposition will 
come from those who mistrust the various forms of internationalism, who dislike the 
expanding role of government, who are concerned with cost, and who think we could 
sell most of these products if we didn't give them away. 
Confrontations of this kind have been going on for a long time. The advocates 
have succeeded in keeping the concessional programs alive, even through a time of 
shortage. The opponents have succeeded in keeping the program from growing. 
It is only recently that government assumed responsibility for the food needs 
of our own citizens and public acceptance of this principle is far from complete. 
The extension of the principle beyond our own borders is a major step, unlikely to 
win full or early support. The food aid advocates have won a beachhead and the 
opponents have prevented a breakout. 
The radius of human concern has lengthened over time. It is reasonable to 
expect the volume of international food aid to increase somewhat in the years ahead. 
But if we price our products competitively this will continue to be a small pro-
portion of our total exports. 
6. What will be our policies with respect to the New International Economic Or-
der? A convenient grouping of the world's more than 160 countries puts the devel-
oped nations of the Western world in one bloc and the communist countries of the 
Eastern world in another. The remaining countries -- lithe South,1I the "Less 
Developed Countries ll -- now number 114 and have 1.75 billion people. They are not 
clearly either among the constitutionally democratic or the authoritarian nations. 
They are the Third World, mostly new, mostly agricultural, and mostly poor. 
The Third World nations attribute some share of their problems to the estab-
lished economic order, which reflects the dominance of the developed nations. They 
allege that the developed countries exploit those th~t ~~e ~ess developed and accom-
plish this in part through trade. The Third world)t~~~er5?e proposes a New Inter-
national Economic Order, the purpose of which is to redistribute wealth. The main 
components of this proposed new order are: assured markets for them in the developed 
countries; price increases (and protection against price declines) for their export 
commodities, to be achieved by the use of indexation and buffer stocks; protection 
against sharp price increases for commodities they import; a fund, underwritten by 
the developed nations, to provide the financial backing necessary for the stabil-
ization plan; and large-scale grants for economic development, unrestricted as to 
use, provided by the developed nations. 
The Third World has neither the economic nor the military power to put these 
proposals into effect. But politically, in the international organizations, with 
one country-one vote, the Third World can be effective. In 1973 nations contributing 
less than 5 percent of the United Nations'budget and having only 10 percent of the 
world's population nevertheless had the necessary two-thirds vote to apportion the 
budget in any way they liked. The desire of the united States to be on as good 
terms as possible with these countries, plus their voting strength in the United 
Nations, require that their proposals be given consideration rather than dismissed 
out of hand. Additionally. and importantly, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) has taken diplomatic and political leadership on behalf of the 
developing countries. American dependence on oil imports is so great as to re-
quire a certain respect for this leadership and hence more attentiveness to demands 
of the New International Economic Order than would otherwise be the case. 
Agricultural products are a fairly important part of the international trade 
of the Third World, both import and export. Deference to Third World proposals 
would influence our international trade in farm products during the decade ahead. 
On the one hand, to the degree that their proposals might increase Third World 
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nations' rate of economic growth, our agricultural exports would be increased. On 
the other hand, concessions to them might result in increased imports into the 
United States of beef, sugar, oilseeds, and specialty products. Thei~ enhanced 
ability to produce tobacco, rice, and cotton might cut into our exports of these 
products. 
7. How will we view international agricultural development? During the past 
century the United States has built up the best body of agricultural knowledge and 
experience possessed by any country. This is an asset that we have, which our 
rivals lack, and which our friends need. And the need is great. In the developing 
countries of the world, increasing population puts heavy pressure on agriculture. 
For thirty years we have had a publicly supported program of modest dimensions 
to assist the development of agriculture in other nations. Supporting this effort 
have been humanitarian groups, the internationally-minded, government people who 
run the program, and those who note that many of the nations we have helped are 
now among our good commercial customers. Opposing it have been certain farm people 
who fear that we might be putting potential rivals into the agricultural export 
business, depriving ourselves of export opportunities. Also opposed are those who 
object to the cost of the program, and those who feel that our responsibility for 
agricultural development stops at our own borders. 
The net result of this controversy has been something of a standoff. Tax-
supported international agricultural development programs have been virtually stag-
nant for some time. They have declined relatively if not absolutely. The status 
of these programs will be an issue during the 1980s. The issue is similar to that 
concerning food aid. To what degree does responsibility transcend national borders? 
Wherein lies our enlightened self-interest? What is the trade-off between the 
short-run and the long-run? How and to what degree should the special interest be 
subordinated to the general interest? 
Time probably is on the side of a broadened rather than a narrow feeling of 
responsibility. We may come to believe that international agricultural development 
is not a zero-sum game in which someone's gain involves a loss to someone else. 
We may learn that it is a positive-sum game, from which can come long-run gains for 
all. Whether the 1980s will produce this perception cannot now be judged. 
* * * * * * The thought quickly leaps to the mind of a farm oriented person: let us take 
hold of these issues and resolve them in the interests of farm people. Let us use 
our power base, the farm organizations, the agricultural committees of the Congress, 
and the Secretary of Agriculture, to get this done. 
It is not that simple. Politics is arithmetic. Let me layout the new 
math of agricultural trade policy. Farmers now number 2.8 percent of the popula-
tion. That is, this is the figure if you go by the census definition and count 
as a farmer everyone who sells $1000 worth of farm products. 
When we set up the Department of Agriculture more than 100 years ago, farm 
people totaled 59 percent of the population. Generously counted the number is 
now less than 3 percent and declining. 
A Secretary of Agriculture with a constituency of that size can't dictate 
policy to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury. It is even 
difficult for him to get the ear of the Preside.nt. 
The perception of this drastic change has not yet come through to most farm 
people. The inclination is to think of the power structure as it was, and to 
think in terms of strategies that formerly worked. 
What farm people and their leaders must do in the decade ahead is to dis-
cover where lies their legitimate interest and to pursue that interest with 
strategy suited to their status as a political minority. That involves making 
friends, finding common ground, engaging in tradeoffs, de-escalating issues that 
are likely to lose and concentrating on issues that are important and might be 
won. Knee-jerk opposition to nonfarm initiatives will not suffice. It dissipates 
energy and impairs our good will. For a minority, confrontation politics usually 
results in glorious defeat, which, however glorious, is still defeat. 
In the judgment I am offering, the issues on which to concentrate are to 
keep the export market as open as possible, to fight protectionism at home and 
abroad, and to resist the use of embargoes that would depress the domestic price 
of food. 52 
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED 
A. L. (Roy) Frederick 
Agricultural Economist 
Kansas State University 
Charged as I am with the responsibility of summarizing this seminar, I am 
tempted to begin by slightly rearranging the words in the title of this talk. If, 
for example, the title were changed to "What Have We Learned?" an accurate 
answer would be "a great deal." I say this notwithstanding the fact that what each 
of us learned has been highly individualistic. 
An old line about economists has it that whenever two economists are in a 
room, there are three opinions about the issue under discussion. At least a half-
dozen economists took part in this seminar, as speakers or listeners. In summar-
izing I have my hands full. Nevertheless, I will try. 
A Few General Comments 
The theme for this seminar proved excellent and the roster of speakers 
outstanding. Missourians present should have been proud of speakers who are mem-
bers of UMC faculty. But on- and off-campus speakers were blended well. 
The title of the seminar, II International Affairs and U. S. Agriculture," 
implies that its planners wanted it to be something more than another agricultural 
trade conference. It was that. To cite a few examples, the addresses by Tillema, 
Lucas, Schilling, and Paarlberg take us well beyond a mere recitation of trade 
statistics. The focus of the seminar was to help all of us better understand why 
we1re where we are and, more importantly, where we may be headed in the future. 
Agricultural trade of the united States may be placed in historical, political, 
geographic, economic, and social contexts. 
The audience obviously wanted to learn as much as possible about the topic, 
as indicated by enthusiastic questioning of speakers and associated discussion. 
But more learning is ahead of us. Moreover, we need to be not only good but fast 
learners, in order to get the word to others. 
Individual Addresses 
In selecting what I thought to be highlights of individual addresses, I run 
a risk of misinterpreting or taking out of context. Certainly a good base for under-
standing the current pattern of agricultural trade in the United States was presented 
in the addresses by Richard Bell and Dawson Ahalt. Mr. Bell and Mr. Ahalt pointed 
out three , or four things that I think are significant. They, of course, mentioned 
the phenomenal growth of exports during the last decade. They noted that the cur-
rent world grain, oilseed, and cotton stocks are quite tight, especially those of 
feed grains and cotton. A third factor was that for the short run (meaning the 
next several months), prices that are paid around the world will depend primarily on 
the weather. 
Finally, if we are to look several years down the line, we could anticipate 
that the long-run prospects for trade look quite good. There are several reasons 
for that, too. One that has been identified is the constantly increasing popula-
tion of the world. Also, in some of the resource rich nations citizens will re-
ceive higher incomes. There has been a general upgrading of diets in many parts of 
the world (including the centrally planned economies). Specifically, what we are 
talking about is more meat available to the average consumer. 
Mr. Bell expressed a view that the Soviet embargo would be rescinded as prom-
ised by Governor Reagan in the campaign. He was less sure, however, about negotiating 
another agreement when the current one expires in October 1981. Several speakers in 
the seminar expressed the view that the embargo was not accomplishing a great deal at 
this time from a foreign policy viewpoint. I personally, however, wonder if we may 
still need the embargo from the standpoint of reduced availability of certain comn1od-
ities, in particular the feed grains that the Soviets have been buying from this 
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There also was an opinion expressed by Mr. Bell in rather forceful terms 
that bilateral agreements in general are not desirable, and he specifically 
questioned the recent agreement with the Peoples Republic of China. He indicated 
that we will continue to have plenty of market opportunities without such agree-
ments, and he specifically mentioned Nigeria and Mexico as good possibilities for 
increased trade expansion during the next two decades. 
Mr. Ahalt, on the other hand, defended the agreement with the Chinese saying 
that because of the size of that country, their political system, and the fact 
that their buying of U. S. grain could cause great fluctuations in our markets, it 
was best to have an appropriate agreement. 
During the discussion period after Mr. Bellis talk, a number of good ques-
tions were asked relative to topics we are going to hear about the next few years. 
Among them are: 
1. What effect will increased grain exports have on the livestock sector? 
The idea, of course, is that increased exports can be expected to bring higher 
grain prices, which will make it more costly to feed our cattle, swine,and poultry. 
2. What about the maintenance of our natural resource base, both the soil 
itself and nutrients to be added to the soil, especially fertilizer, as we go for 
increased exports? Some persons are saying that unless we are very careful with 
regard to conservation of our natural resource base we will have problems in a 
few years because of its depletion. 
3. A question that at least implicitly came out in discussion relates to 
those unfortunate people around the world who from time to time through no fault 
of their own are going to need food aid from the united States. If as expected 
our commercial exports continue to grow, will we be able to respond in a humani-
tarian way to these needs? Some persons are beginning to wonder. 
The second major address was given by Professor Herbert Tillema, entitled 
IIAmerica in a Changing World. 1I I think everyone found it to be forceful and thought-
provoking. It gave many of us some new perceptions of the world around us. 
The basic thesis of Professor Tillemals talk was that the world is present-
ing us with II problems which we donlt want to face and alternatives which 
we donlt want to choose. 1I He rather eloquently supported that thesis with a 
number of good examples. He said our power base has been dispersed both polit-
ically and economically since World War II. Many more intergovernmental organ-
izations such as OPEC are having an impact on world politics and, in fact, on the 
world order in this day and age. He cited the fact that seven countries now have 
nuclear power compared with only one -- the United States right after World 
War II. 
Eight to nine percent of the gross national product of the United States now 
enters international trade. This is substantially more than the percentage just 
after the last world war. Because of this greater interdependence with other 
countries, we have lost some of our ability to shape our own future. We have to 
be more aware of what is going on in the world around us. Professor Tillema in-
dicated, and I think this is a significant point, that as a society we probably 
do not understand the changes that have taken place during the last 30 to 35 years. 
We probably fail to understand our present place in the total world community and 
we almost certainly do not have a very good handle as a total society on where we 
are headed. Professor Tillema said that we are unable to decide whether we really 
want to return to our glory days when the rest of the world would fall to its knees 
at the mere mention of the United States, or whether we would rather let the rest 
of the world go its own way. He calls this a II public ambivalence ll and said that 
this ambivalence is what leads to so much turnover in our elected officials as 
exemplified by this last election. 
The concluding thought of Professor Tillemals address was that if we become 
unduly fearful or unduly optimistic about where we are, we are not being fair to 
ourselves. Even great powers do not always have their way. The United States has 
not fallen into purgatory. We have fallen from a position of special privilege 
which we enjoyed throughout a great portion of our history. We now encounter ob-
stacles similar to other nations. There are some risks that we have to assume. There 
will be some costs in assuming these risks, and sometimes we are even going to en-
counter failure. We need to recognize each of these things. 
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The noon luncheon featured a very provocative talk by Christopher Lucas, 
Professor of Education, UMC, on the Near East. Professor Lucas P9inted out a 
number of things that I thought were significant. He told us that there were 
really five events that were shaping that region of the world, generally called the 
Arab community, extending from the Atlantic Ocean to Persia (Iran). He mentioned 
specifically Pan-Arabism which is a feeling among the Arab countries of general dis-
respect for foreigners and especially for the Western world. But second, at the 
other end of the spectrum there is radical nationalism, which is a desire by in-
dividual countries in the region each to control its own destiny. Sometimes those 
feelings about each nation's own destiny contrast rather sharply with the overall 
goal of Arab unity. Another thing that makes the Middle East rather interesting 
is that the peoples are bound together by the Islamic faith although here again 
there is a difference in the intensity of that faith as exemplified in individual 
countries. 
Many of the Middle East countries, of coursej have large reserves of oil 
which have changed their economies remarkably in the last 10 years. 
Fjnally, another issue that shapes the Middle Eastern area of the world is 
the Palestinian question. There have been shifting currents over a period of time 
but a Palestinian state is perhaps not any closer to reality now than a few years 
ago. Professor Lucas described in some detail a hodgepodge of alliances among in-
dividual countries particularly focused on the current war between Iran and Iraq. 
A bewildering array of alliances has been concocted, often with quickly changing 
pairings. Many ironies are involved in this concoction of alliances. 
Thursday afternoon's portion of the seminar began with an address by Pro-
fessor Abner Womack. He gave a good historical perspective of trade patterns of 
the united States. But if I had to point a single theme (I thought it a good one) 
it would be that we ought to look at world trading patterns with the united States 
included compared with what is happening in world trade with the United States 
excluded. Professor Womack has found in his work that up to this point the united 
States has been able to make up the increasing "gap" between world consumption and 
production of grains and soybeans. There are some variations in what is happening 
in individual commodity sectors, however. 
Professor Rhodes introduced Professor Womack as an economic chiropractor be-
cause he is constantly massaging data. Among the Womack-massaged data perhaps the 
most interesting related to the dollars and cents impact on grain prices of more 
sales to the centrally planned economies. The data are worth looking up. Pro-
fessor Womack showed some rather significant price impacts, mostly positive, from 
our increased sales to the centrally planned economies. He also showed the impact 
that various policy and economic decisions made in other countries had on our 
grain prices. 
Professor Don Schilling addressed the topic, "International Financial-
Monetary Balances." He promised few numbers and diagrams but he did not promise 
that we would understand all the nuances of a flexible exchange system the first 
time around. He noted first that the gold standard had provided a fixed exchange 
rate for our dollars for many years; and then there was the Bretton Woods system. 
Only within the last decade have we been under a system of flexible exchange rates. 
The move to flexible exchange rates was the brain child of Milton Friedman, 
who has been perhaps the most prominent monetary economist of our era. It was 
argued that when flexible exchange rates were instituted in the united States the 
change would bring several improvements to international trade: (1) appreciable 
stability to exchange rates, (2) greater liquidity in exchanging dollars to other 
currencies and vice-versa, and (3) reduced influence of the dollar. Europeans 
were particularly interested in the last objective because it had been their 
desire for a long time to decrease the influence of the dollar in international 
transactions. But, briefly summarized, flexible exchange rates have not accomp-
lished everything expected of them. We continue to have great leaps back and forth 
in the exchange rate between dollars and other currencies. Moreover, the liquidity 
problem has remai.ned with us, and floating rates have not changed the significance 
of dollars in international transactions. They are probably as significant as they 
were before flotation. 
As we become more involved in international transactions I think we are going 
to hear more about exchange rates. We simply cannot conduct trade without an effic-
iently operating international system for exchanging currencies. 
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Professor Alex McCalla concluded Thursday afternoon's program with an ad-
dress, "The Political Economy of the World Grain Trade." It was a comprehensive 
and articulate statement of the many factors that are involved in understanding 
what is happening in the world grain trade today. Professor McCalla suggested 
that the grain trade has to be placed in a broad political context with many actors: 
some large, some small, some representing their government or a government agency, 
some representing a private merchandising firm, some with short-run political ob-
jectives, and so on. He like several speakers before and after him, outlined a 
number of trade statistics that helped to give focus to where we are today. For 
example, from 15 to 20 percent of world wheat production enters international trade 
in a typical year, a stable percentage. But the 12 to 13 percent of coarse grain 
that enters international trade is double the figure of 20 years ago, an indicator 
of desire for more livestock products in peoples' diets worldwide. 
Professor McCalla says that there are really two opposite models that can be 
examined for understanding the world grain trade. One would be a neo-classical 
model of many small marketing firms, minimal government involvement, and a generally 
truly competitive environment. The other model would have rather heavy involvement 
by government as it would be responsible for handling large residuals of grain 
through either a reserve program or direct marketing. He says the reality of inter-
national trade at the present time is that governments and large private actors 
distort what would otherwise be free trade. These distortions occur for several 
reasons, most of them related to internal domestic situations. Three specific rea-
sons are worthy of emphasizing: (1) many countries, the united States included, 
continue to want to protect their own agriculture; (2) there also is a desire in 
many countries to maintain low food prices domestically; and (3) a rather per-
vasive objective is to manage trade relations to attain national economic and po-
litical objectives. This third situation, viewed when applied country by coun-
try, almost assures that truly free trade among individual countries of the world 
will not occur any time in the near future. 
Don Paarlberg discussed what I would call the international agricultural 
agenda for the next decade. He identified what he called seven policy issues. I 
would go a bit farther and call them policy challenges. All of us should begin 
thinking about these issues/challenges now -- not a few years from now, when it 
will be too late to do anything about them. The seven are: 
1. What will be the institutional arrangement for our exports? 
2. Will farm products continue to be a tool of international diplomacy? 
3. will embargoes be used to hold down the price of food in the United 
States? 
4. will there be a trend toward protectionism? 
5. What about food aid? 
6. What wiil be our policies regarding the New International Order, now 
led by some of the oil-rich, les.s developed countries? 
7. How will we view international agricultural development? 
Dr. Paarlberg pointed out that farmers are not going to be able to control 
these issues if they assume a confrontation strategy with consumers either in this 
country or overseas. He believes farmers ought to use their diminished strength 
for three purposes: 
1. To keep markets as open as possible. 
2. To fight protectionism -- in agriculture and outside agriculture, at 
home and abroad. 
3. To resist using embargoes to reduce domestic food prices. 
Finally, because they relate to a different subject than other papers I am 
not reviewing at length the remarks by Harold Breimyer who, of course, has been the 
lead person in these Perry seminars for the last eight years. I found a great deal 
of food for thought in what he said, such as his contention that the goal of educa-
tion in whatever form it takes ought to be to stretch peoples' horizons. For h1s 
leadership of the Perry seminars we all extend our sincere thanks. 
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EDUCATION IN PUBLIC POLICY: 
EIGHT YEARS OF THE UMC-PERRY FOUNDATION SEMINAR 
Harold F. Breimyer 
Perry Foundation Professor of Agricultural 
Economics and Extension Economist 
IIBut where shall wisdom be found? And where is the place of 
understanding? II 
-- Job 28:12 
IILLand Grant universitie.§/ would soon LI86i7 be asked to 
justify their existence in the light of society's needs. 
-- Edward Danforth Eddy, Jr. 
IIPhilosophers should have something to say to their fellow 
citizens . . . . II 
-- Sidney Hook 
II 
Of all the attributes of the American character few are of such long standing 
as faith in education. The story has been told often. We know about the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787 with its provision for school lands, and the Morrill Act of 1862 
setting up Land Grant colleges. In early Missouri local people sometimes were more 
concerned to build a local school than roads leading to it. Education in our tra-
dition has been looked to for goals as far ranging as self-realization for the in-
dividual and preservation of democracy. 
My topic calls for addressing education in public policy, with specific 
reference to the eight public seminars on agricultural marketing and policy jointly 
sponsored by the University of Missouri-Columbia and the Perry Foundation of Robs-
town, Texas. The series ends with this seminar. It is timely to take stock of 
what we have learned during a period equivalent to two terms of office of the U. S. 
Presidency. 
I will comment briefly on University-Perry Foundation relationships, then take 
up broader issues in education in public policy. I will reveal some of my appre-
hensions about whether education is still as solidly endorsed as it once was. I 
particularly ask about receptivity to education in public affairs, which invariably 
steps on someone's toe, desecrates some sacred cow, or threatens an economic 
interest. 
An Invitation Acted On 
Almost a decade ago Thomas, Richard, and Michelle Perry came to our campus 
and explained to Dean Kiehl and others their interest in advancing public under-
standing of issues in agricultural marketing and policy. We at UMC, they whispered 
into our eager ears, conveyed an image more of denim overalls than of a stuffed 
shirt. We were reputed to be genuinely interested in improving the agriculture of 
America's Heartland. 
A contract was negotiated whereby the salary of a Perry Foundation Professor 
of Agricultural Economics was to be supplemented modestly and an annual public sem-
inar was to be held. The intended purpose of the seminar was 
. to promote the development of information relative to the 
socio-economic forces that bear on the welfare of family operated 
farms and ranches, and upon the income to those operators; to 
disseminate that information widely among agricultural leaders of 
the nation; and to provide a forum for the exchange of information 
and discussion of current matters related thereto by leaders of 
organizations, institutions, ~nd legislators concerned with these 
matters. The Seminar Lwas t.Q,l be scholarly in nature, in the 
academic tradition, with all aspects of a policy issue to be 
"explored. 
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Seminars have covered topics ranging from the survivability of the family 
farm to the causes and cures of inflation. l They have been presented with a min-
imum of ballyhoo and also with a minimum budget. Speakers invited have not been 
public figures who charge high fees. They have been persons of less prominence but 
equal competence who have kept the seminars down-to-earth and solid with subject 
matter. 
An early conversation about terms of' a University-Perry Foundation relation-
ship bears on the general issue of education in public policy. In talking with 
Richard and Michelle Perry I conunented as diplomatically as I knew how, "You know 
that in carrying out a contract we at UMC will always be receptive to suggestions 
but otherwise the principle of academic freedom will apply." I then tried to be 
jocular: "In a sense you are putting up your money and taking your chances." They 
instantly confirmed this understanding. I testify that it has been adhered to 
scrupulously throughout these eight years. 
Education's Promise and Peril 
Education may be blessed but it seldom is benign. It is potentially as ex-
plosive as dynamite, as inciting as yellow journalism, as change-inducing as a 
dictator's decree. If confined to the privileged few, education erects class bar-
riers; made available to all, it tears them down. In like vein, orthodox teaching 
may be politically "safe" but it stymies innovation. Only the different, the un-
orthodox, leads in new directions. 
In its best role education does not preserve knowledge so much as it enlarges 
and revises it. In doing so it encounters resistance. Conventional wisdom never 
lacks for partisan defenders. A scientist who questions time to plant potatoes (the 
light of the moon -- or the dark?), the safety of a herbicide, or the proper level 
of price support for cotton runs risk of rebuff. Innovative research and education 
are possible only if their audience is sympathetically receptive. Without that 
understanding and support, meaningful research will disappear. 
Agricultural scientists deservedly take pride in what they have contributed 
but I suggest that the greater credit goes to U. S. citizens who create the mileau 
in which they can work. 
Personal Achievement and Social Ideology 
In the annals of education surely nothing surpa~ses in poignancy the career 
of Helen Keller. Joseph Lash's account is beautiful. Helen Keller in a sense 
accomplished more than most of us can ever hope to do. But the deeper meaning of 
the Helen Keller story is the dedicated human support that was necessary for so 
glorious an achievement. It was necessary that her teacher, Anne ~ullivan Macy, as 
she herself put it, give up her life that Helen Keller might live. Polly Thompson 
was faithful4 for 36 years. And not fewer than a hundred individuals and a whole 
organization gave time and money and leadership so that Helen might learn. Helen 
Keller then served humanity through promoting the causes of the blind. 
A second book I have read recently is History of Christianity,S which is 
broader than its title and in fact a history of ideological conflict. It reminds 
how prone are human beings to make themselves victims of their folklore, fantasies, 
and fears. They persecute themselves by their ever changing ideologies, which in-
variably interweave the religious and secular. In recent centuries wars of ide-
ology have outnumbered those of aggression; and persecution for beliefs has over-
shadowed all other inhumanities. 
I Titles are "Central Issues in Agricultural Policy," IIIncome Tax Rules and Agri-
culture,1I IIIn Search of a U. S. Food Policy, II "In Search of Better Marketing, II 
"International Monetary and Trade Rules and Midwest Agriculture,lI "Can the Family 
Farm Survive?," II Inflation." 
2 Joseph P. Lash, Helen and Teacher, Delacorte Press/Seymour Lawrence, New York, 1980. 
3 P. 626. 
4 American Foundation for the Blind. 
5 Paul Johnson, A History of Christianity, Atheneum, New York, 1976. 
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I offer these comments to give more credence to my central message that the 
place of education in society is determined mainly by the atmosphere of receptivity 
by the prevailing ideology. As though to give punch to this message, the record 
of the centuries is that educators who tried to buck the trend, even in the interest 
of conciliation, often were silenced. The History of Christianity account dis-
tresses as much as Helen Keller's story inspires. 
I comment in this way for the further reason that I believe the Presidential 
campaign of 1980, although advertised as a contest of personalities, was in fact 
the most ideological one we have witnessed in our century. It remains to be seen 
whether our nation continues in the direction of sharper divisiveness, less ideo-
logical tolerance. If that should be the case, the role of education will narrow. 
Criteria for Judging Agricultural Education 
The record of history ought to convince that education is never secure, that it 
cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, education is always in potential 
jeopardy. Against this backdrop the national dedication in the Northwest Ordinance, 
the Morrill Act, and the Hatch and Smith-Lever Acts for agricultural research and 
extension takes on drama. By the6 same token education in agriculture will always 
need both sponsors and defenders. 
Education in agriculture will also necessarily look to its institutions. 
Land Grant universities, agricultural experiment stations, and university extension 
services have been the wheelhorses. They are now being supplemented and to some 
extent supplanted. I will list the more important newcomers and offer a brief 
evaluation. 
First, though, a note on criteria for judging educational performance. Pos-
sibly the first criterion that comes to mind is technical. How relevant, accurate, 
reliable is the content of what is taught? This question is always properly raised. 
The second criterion is honesty, better known as intellectual integrity. This takes 
on so much importance for the reasons I have just cited, namely, that education al-
most always is unsettling to someone. It is not always easy to be honest. 
I may be especially sensitive to the issue of intellectual integrity because 
I work in public policy. However, I deny emphatically that only educators in my 
field find their courage and integrity tested. Years ago I worked in USDA next 
door to a former Dean of Agriculture at Michigan State University. He told me 
plaintively how he had been the victim of his courage in declaring that certain 
proprietary mineral mixtures had no magic properties in making hogs or calves grow. 
Here on our campus in 1979 I was proud of our agricultural engineers, chemists, 
and others who barnstormed the state of Missouri educating about farm-produced fuel. 
In the face of pleas to promise every Missouri farmer a backyard source, they de-
tailed patiently the problems and costs involved. They denied that a coil of 
copper tubing and a kerosene lamp would protect against the whims of the sheiks of 
Araby. 
Educators in public policy and the physical scientists in agriculture all 
risk non-acceptance. We share an equal obligation to be scientifically objective. 
But above all, every social and physical scientist in agriculture depends critically 
on the good will of citizens who defend education and educators, even though at 
times their private apple cart may be upset. 
Today's Institutions: An Inventory 
For about a century Land Grant universities and the U. S. Department of Agri-
culture together with their experiment stations and extension services had a virtual 
monopoly on agricultural education. They enjoy a monopoly no longer. They have 
several challengers. 
Among strongest challengers are a host of private universities and research 
organizations. Together they are crowding out Land Grant schools, particularly in 
the research grant bazaar that federal funding has become. 
6 I am using the term "agriculture" in its broadest sense to include home economics, 
perhaps forestry, and any other closely associated field of knowledge. The Morrill 
Act included engineering too, of course. 
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Another category is a hybrid: it fits in no slot. It is the contractual 
services that public universities make commercially available. There is insti-
tutional contracting, and there is also private consulting that university staff 
members carryon. Combined, these have become sizable. They raise some pene-
trating questions that I will touch on below. 
Fourth on my list are the private foundations, of which the Perry Foundation 
is an example. Ford, Rockefeller, and Kellogg probably have best name-recognition. 
My fifth and final entry is somewhat different and it is more significant in 
education on public policy than on more technical subjects. It is the melange of 
private interest groups that spend millions of dollars to influence public opinion. 
They buy access to radio, TV, newspapers, and magazines. Issue advertising wherein 
an oil company, for instance, will buy an entire page in a leading journal to tell 
its story has become a major source of revenue to the media and a doughty rival to 
those of us in public employ who are commissioned to be scholarly and intellectually 
honest. 
A Personal Evaluation 
Each of the institutions for education in agriculture is subject to critique. 
Few observers would deny the good record of Land Grant universities and the 
U. S. Department of Agriculture. Theirs is a technological success story. As a 
policy economist I defend economic education too. American farmers are as well in-
formed about public affairs as any group of the population. 
Nevertheless, more questions have been raised in recent years than previously. 
Some critics say Land Grant schools, cushioned by monopoly status, have drifted in-
to stuffiness. Categorical denial would be wrong but by and large I am slow to 
join in rebuke. In the Hard Tomatoes-Hard Times episode of a few years ago I 
neither accused nor over-defended. It did not hurt us to be shaken up a bit. I 
dodge the commercial agriculture issue: I neither allege nQ~ ask College of Agri-
culture priority. First of all, the term itself is nebulous, really meaningless. 
But also we are in the public service and "public" has no natural boundary. Even 
though our time and talents are necessarily limited and we are not all things to 
all people, in another sense we stand ready to try to be something to just about 
everyone. 
The private schools and research organizations that are crowding us Land 
Grant folk so hard cannot be stopped. Yet each advance by them does not signify 
failure by us. My principal concern is directed to the research-grant mechanism 
of which they are both the most skillful practitioners and prime beneficiaries. 
More and more of all agricultural research is funded by individual project grants. 
Somehow the research and educational needs of agriculture do not truly lend them-
selves to dissection into atomistic parts. Grantsmanship itself is becoming a 
dextrous art. I am puzzled and apprehensive. But this subject must await another 
seminar and a more accomplished critic. 
Next on my inventory list is the private contracting that is now a substantial 
part of the Land Grant scene. It takes the form, as I noted, of institutional ser-
vices and individual consulting. I hasten to add that these practices are kept 
within bounds better at the University of Missouri than at a number of other schools. 
Nevertheless, they are a serious threat to the principles that Land Grant schools 
have stood for. I have written more on this subject than any other agricultural 
economist. On one occasion I charged that a university that converts itself into 
a research contractor indistinguishable from a private organization "compromise@ 
the basic role of the Land Grant university. That role is to spread knowledge to 
make it a public good. Any selective dispensatio~ for private advantage violates 
the institution's purpose, its reason for being. 1I 
Probably every major Land Grant university is feeling a pinch in public appro-
priations and therefore is more eager to attract private funding. One conclusion is 
certain: life becomes harder for research administrators who are faithful to the 
Land Grant mission. In a recent meeting Iowa State's CAST invoked discussion by 
7 Harold F. Breimyer, "Public Sector Research and Education and the Agribusiness 
Complex: Unholy Alliance or Socially Beneficial Partnership?" American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, Dec. 1973, pp. 993-6. Quotation p. 995. 
60 
virtue of the funding it receives from agrichemical companies. It was suggested 
that commodity organizations would present less chance of conflict of interest. 
Check-off funds typically extend to research as well as promotion. The only judg-
ment one can offer is that not the source of money but the circumspectness in re-
lationship is what counts most. To repeat, research administration is more difficult 
with private than with public funding. 
I have often wondered if the University of Missouri ought to set up a separate 
but parallel corporation to make research services contractually available. uni-
versity scientists would have dual appointments. However, their division of 
loyalties would have to be monitored carefully. 
On institutional funding of research I only admonish rectitude but on another 
practice my stand is for absolute prohibition. I refer to private consulting for 
pay by university personnel. In my judgment the Board of Curators and President 
Olson would be well advised to bring private consulting by university faculty 
members to a complete halt. The practice amounts, I have written to dividing 
a scientist's IItime and allegiance so as to multiply his income ... A It can be es-
pecially inappropriate in research or education where public policy is involved. 
It is not just that consulting income can subtly undermine the integrity of the 
individual. It is also that often not the wisdom of the scientist but the standing 
of his sponsoring university is what is being bought. It's a messy situation. 
Few agricultural economists have sold their souls. None on this campus has 
done so. Yet the consulting practice can be vicious and a denial of the Land Grant 
tradition. A few years ago the Director of Extension for Indiana tried to enlist 
all Directors in the country in prohibiting in-state consulting by extension per-
sonnel. Not surprisingly but regretfully, he was not successful. 
Among institutions engaged in agricultural research and education the newest 
and in some respects most exciting are the private foundations. I once suggested, 
with tongue in cheek, that9they are the "issue of a union between private profit and income tax law. . .... I hesitate to offer a sweeping judgment on their per-
formance, partly because information is lacking but also because the situation is 
mixed. I have testified to the absolute integrity of relations between the UMC and 
the Perry Foundation. So far as I know, the record of Rockefeller, Ford, and similar 
groups is unsullied. 
But there is a dark side to this moon. It is the growing role non-profit 
organizations play in disguised interest pleading. Recently a researcher approach-
ing a well known IIInstitute ll happened to encounter an official who was in candid 
mood. "You must understand," he explained, IIthat we only finance research that 
will support the positions we take on political issues. 1I Another Institute with 
apparently limitless funds announces almost weekly some new study by a famous 
scholar verifying that Government is implicitly bad and private enterprise holy and 
flawless. Surely that is a questionable use of tax-refugee funds. 
I will not take time to review the role of private businesses in research and 
education. Privately funded research for private purpose raises no public issue. 
But privately funded educational or propaganda activities including the rapidly 
growing issue advertising is the most formidable competition we in the academic 
sector face. I wonder whether the first amendment to the Constitution really per-
mits the most blatant practices in dishonesty. Somehow I sense that the amendment 
was intended to protect opinions, creeds, and even fantasies, but not falsehoods. 
Does paying the dollar (or thousands of them) for access to media relieve of obli-
gation to be truthful? How much absolution does the tiny IIpaid advertisement ll 
label convey? 
The Ideology of Agricultural Research and Extension 
I turn now to the most sensitive and difficult aspect of my subject. As I 
noted above, as human beings work out their ways of living together they develop a 
8 
9 
Harold F. Breimyer, liThe Stern Test of Objectivity for the Useful Science of Agri-
cultural Economics, II Journal of Farm. Economics, May 1967, pp. 339-50. Quotation 
p. 348. 
P. 350 in 1967 article. 
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set of beliefs and codes that compose an ideology. The history of Christianity 
-- and even more of Islam! -- shows how gripping ideologies can be. Agricultural 
economists like to declare they are free of ideology as they only recite scien-
tific data about price support or the effect of a grain embargo. Malarky! In 
agricultural matters both teachers and learners are subject to the prevailing 
ideology and unless they share a certain minimum of credal values they will talk 
past each other. 
What beliefs and values underlie responsible education in public policy? Not 
long ago I was invited to write a bi-weekly column for the Delta Farm Press and 
affiliated farm papers. In my first column I philosophized on public attitudes 
toward economic policymaking, in pretty salty language. People disagree on economic 
policies not because of lack of data, I wrote, but because they "screen out dis-
tasteful information and respond to that which fits their biases, their pocketbooks." 
Human beings have "mental sieves," I added, "with mesh to fit their self interests." 
But there also is a problem of assessing just what our common values are. II If we 
put aside our personal concerns and try to be public spirited," I asked, "do we 
know what is truly good for the country? What are Americans I ideals? . Are 
we still Puritannical? Do we retain the work ethic? Are we basically, at heart, 
generous and democratic?" 
Most of us in the field of public affairs assume that the majority of Ameri-
cans hold to traditional values. But we might be wrong, I wrote. "A certain pro-
portion of citizens are pretty selfish." Also, "A smattering are at heart aris-
tocratic or plutocratic, II believing themselves and a few friends "to be natively 10 
superior and to deserve all the benefits of class distinction they can get .... " 
Lest this seem too harsh, what I really believe is that most of us have a 
little of both the sinner and saint in us. In many respects economists in public 
affairs are like preachers: we try to reach and bring forth the more benevolent 
of human actions. Conservation is a clear example. Farmers can add to 1981 income 
by disregarding conservation but they thereby deprive all humanity to follow. Like-
wise, unwisely chosen price supports can boost short-term income but will lead to 
problems in the future. Good educators, I believe, are more far-seeing. 
A basic value in agriculture as we have known it is the worth of the family 
farm. It is based not so much on productivity as on the socio-cultural status of 
the farmer and his family and their place in the rural community. I will not plead 
the case here; but I contend that respect for the family farm as an institution is 
essential to every agronomist, animal scientist, and engineer who serves the family 
farmer, for the reason that without rapport with his clientele an educator fails. 
This is part of a value system. 
The issue of the family farm gives occasion for my favorite illustration of 
conflict between individual self interest and long run common welfare. It involves 
tax concessions in farming. Under the heading of family farming's non-instinct for 
self-preservation I preach that the oh-so-attractive deductions individual farmers 
make are a wholesale invitation to high-tax-bracket nonfarmers to invade and take 
over. The latest instrument for doing so is use of pension funds with a tax angle. 
Naturally, I am opposed. But family farmers will not repulse those takeover threats 
successfully and permanently until they , are willing to address the basic contra-
diction between the short run individual interest and the long run common good. 
A Testament 
In beginning my Delta Farm Press comments I quizzed myself: "What is my 
value system?" "Pretty traditional," I self-answered. "My generation really be-
lieved that the economic system must be reasonably fair and equitable." Moreover, 
"We also thought that productivity counted for more than financial manipulation." 
Nowadays it sometimes seems, I wrote, that "more money is to be made by I farming' 
the farm programs, getting cheap credit from any available subsidized source, and 
most of all playing the tax-write-off game, than by producing efficiently." 
"These tactics may be privately profitable, particularly in the short run," 
I noted. Then in the best Old Testament style I added, "The object in agriculture 
ought to be to reward farmers for socially-directed productivity and only that." 
10 Delta Farm Press, June 6, 1980. 
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Persons who share this particular code will understand my writings about 
current issues in agricultural policy. Those of opposite persuasion will fail to 
understand. 
Beliefs, creeds, moral values, ideology -- these are crucial in education 
in public affairs. But they bear on all education in agriculture. 
Doubts and Forebodings 
I admitted at the outset that I have apprehensions about the future of pub-
licly sponsored education in agriculture. On this I claim no special insights. 
I believe nearly everyone senses a prevailing dispirit in our nation. The common 
expression is distrust in government. This bothers me first because in a democracy, 
distrust in government is a distrust in ourselves. I grew up during a period when 
government was not trusted and did not deserve to be trusted. It was the 1920s, 
when Secretary Fall gave away the Teapot Dome, Andrew Mellon as Secretary of the 
Treasury made sure big capital controlled small government, and the Capone gang en-
livened the scene. The Babbits of the time promised prosperity for all. A flimsy 
capital structure built up then was corrected in the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
(Then we corrected overexpectations by deflating prices and reneging on debts. 
Now we are more civilized: we pay the debts with half-worthless dollars.) 
The present state of mind bothers me secondly because not only the institution 
of government but many other institutions are in jeopardy. And they all are inter-
related, even the institutions of education. Although I join everyone in deploring 
instances of misconduct by public officials, more than most I am alarmed 
by deteriorating private morality, which in many respects is causal. Private and 
public morality run parallel7 and education, particularly public education, is 
a moral enterprise. 
If economic slowdown is contributing to our malaise it is hard to be hopeful. 
Growing prosperity in years after World War II made them our Golden . Age. Man's 
inhumanities eased, racial discrimination among them. Russia's Sputnik revived 
U. S. support of education. That Age is over. I cannot decide in my own mind 
whether its end is more attributable to epic events such as the Vietnam War and the 
oil embargo of 1973, or to the natural tendency of human beings to rend their own 
social fabric by moral decline. Of only one principle am I certain: that it is 
easier for citizens to be generous, public spirited, compassionate when things are 
going well than when they go badly. 
Now that our economic outlook is less rosy it may require more conscious ef-
fort to make sure our traditional values, which are essentially generous, are pre-
served. I include the value of respect for education. 
One word more on my concern about our capacity to govern ourselves. The knee-
jerk-reflex response to our present distrust in government is to have less of it. 
If we were still a pastoral nation, or even one of small industry, this might be 
possible. In our present situation it is not possible. The only remedy for bad 
government is good government. There is no other. 
All of which leads me to' education once more. In a democracy education in 
public affairsisa part of the process of government. I dare tobelie've that the 
past eigh,t years of UMC-Perry Foundation seminars on agricultural marketing and 
policy have made a positive if modest contribution. 
I have testified to the splendidterm$ of relationship between the Perry 
Foundation and our University. But with all respect to Thomas, Richard, Michelle, 
and James Perry and Deans Kiehl, Smith, and Lennon, and without depreciating the 
contribution made by my colleagues and the 75 . speakers of the eight years, these 
are not the foremost heroes. That 'toga goes to the ' men and women who attend, listen, 
accept some ideas, reject others, and debate. They have borne ~itness to the worth 
of education, not only 1:.hat .which goes with the grain, ' but that which goes against 
it. . 
Those people, by Comin~; listening, and responding, have . voted their thanks to 
the University~ ,the pe.rryfamily, -andthe 'Perry Foundation. I add mine. I arngrate-
ful for ti:le opportunity to. .have:been- the 'Perry Foundation Professor of Agricultural 
Economics attheUnj.:yersityof Missouri for eight good years. 
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